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 The realization requirement is one of the most basic elements of the United 
States income tax. Due to this requirement, any increase in the value of a person’s 
property is not taxed when it occurs. Rather, the tax on asset appreciation is 
deferred until the occurrence of a realization event; that is, until the property is 
transferred in exchange for money or other consideration. By contrast, all other 
forms of income (e.g., salary, rents) are taxed immediately. 
The realization requirement is inequitable because it causes asset appreciation 
to be taxed more favorably than other forms of income, thereby violating the 
normative goal of taxing all forms of income alike. The realization requirement is 
also inefficient because it favors investments generating economic returns in the 
form of asset appreciation (as opposed to periodic returns), thereby violating the 
normative goal of imposing taxes that do not distort investment decisions. In 
addition, the realization requirement adds complexity to the tax system and 
sacrifices potential tax revenue due to the deferral it confers. 
In light of the inequity, inefficiency, and complexity of the realization 
requirement, the requirement should be modified. Reformers have long argued that 
asset appreciation should be taxed as it occurs under a mark-to-market system. 
However, taxing asset appreciation as it occurs presents serious administrative 
problems because it requires an annual assessment of the value of every taxpayer’s 
assets. In addition, strong political resistance exists to taxing “paper gains.” For 
these reasons, it is unlikely that a comprehensive mark-to-market system will ever 
be adopted. 
Due to the dim prospect of adopting a mark-to-market system, this Article 
proposes the adoption of a “disposition” standard of realization. That standard 
would treat every transfer of property as a realization event regardless of whether 
the transferor receives consideration for the transferred property. Unlike current 
law, the disposition standard would tax lifetime gifts, as well as testamentary 
transfers, of appreciated property. 
A disposition standard is a second-best alternative to a mark-to-market system. 
This new standard would curtail the inequity and inefficiency of the current 
realization requirement while posing less significant administrative and political 
problems than a mark-to-market system. In addition, the disposition standard 
would simplify existing law by substituting a clear and administrable set of rules 
for the current ambiguous and anachronistic system. Finally, a disposition 
standard should help to generate much needed tax revenue. 
INTRODUCTION 
For almost a century, the United States has utilized an income tax as a major 
revenue source.1 From an economist’s perspective, an income tax should tax any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Shortly after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, Congress passed the Tariff Act 
of 1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. Earlier versions 
of the income tax date to the Civil War years. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 
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increase in a taxpayer’s wealth when it occurs.2 Accordingly, asset appreciation 
should be taxed as it occurs. The U.S. income tax, however, has always embraced a 
realization requirement, thereby deferring the taxation of asset appreciation until 
the occurrence of a realization event (normally, a sale or exchange of the 
appreciated property).3 
The realization requirement has evolved in an unprincipled manner and remains 
ambiguous to this day.4 When the U.S. income tax originated, neither Congress nor 
the courts debated the question of whether asset appreciation should be taxed as it 
occurred, or instead deferred until realization.5 Rather, the early courts were 
embroiled in a controversy over whether increases in the value of property should 
ever be taxed.6 As such, the law has always been slanted toward deferring the tax 
on asset appreciation.  
Initially, the realization requirement was seen as a constitutional mandate.7 The 
jurisprudence that emerged from this view regarded realization as requiring the 
                                                                                                                 
Stat. 292, 309. In 2008, federal-income-tax collections totaled more than $1.42 trillion. Table 
1. Internal Revenue Collections and Refunds, by Type of Tax, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08dhb01co.xls.  
 2. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (“Personal income 
may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the 
beginning and end of the period in question.”); ROSWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 18 (rev. 
ed. 1945) (“Income is the money value of the net accretion to economic power between two 
points of time.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 3. See infra Part I (discussing the evolution of the realization requirement in U.S. tax 
law). 
 4. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of 
Realization, in TAX STORIES 93, 95 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Kornhauser, 
The Story of Macomber] (“Although realization is a basic concept in our income tax laws, its 
exact parameters are hazy.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of 
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 48 (1992) [hereinafter 
Kornhauser, Constitutional Meaning] (“[W]hat is realization? . . . [T]here is no one 
definitive answer . . . .”); Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 
TAX L. REV. 355, 358 n.8 (2004) (“‘Realization’ does not have a fixed meaning. There is no 
statutory definition and our common understanding derives from its administrative and 
judicial development.”); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and 
Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1992) (“The 
realization requirement, while implicit in the earliest federal income taxes, has never been 
elaborated in the Code. It developed gradually through cases and administrative practice, 
without ever having a well thought out unitary meaning.” (citation omitted)); Reed 
Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
243, 249 n.12 (1992) (“The precise definition of a realization event is unclear . . . .”); 
Edward A. Zelinski, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the 
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 959 (1998) (“[T]he precept of 
realization is not self-defining; it is not always obvious when the taxpayer’s economic 
interest is sufficiently transformed for a realization event to have occurred.”).  
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 30–37 (discussing the origin of the realization 
requirement).  
 6. See infra text accompanying note 29 (noting that the initial issue was whether prior 
years’ appreciation could ever be taxed).  
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 39–43 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision 
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transfer of property in exchange for a tangible benefit (normally money or other 
property).8 By conditioning realization on the contemporaneous receipt of a 
tangible benefit, the courts treated asset appreciation in the same manner as other 
forms of income (e.g., salary, rents), which normally occur when a person receives 
money or property.9 Unlike other forms of income, however, asset appreciation 
confers a benefit on the property owner as the appreciation occurs by increasing the 
taxpayer’s wealth.10 Hence, the benefit from the appreciation is derived before the 
asset is transferred and is independent of the transfer. Indeed, the timing of the 
benefit is precisely why economists have argued that asset appreciation should be 
taxed as it occurs.11 
The view that realization is constitutionally mandated has dissipated during the 
past three-quarters of a century.12 Now the realization requirement is generally 
regarded as a concession to the administrative burdens of, and political opposition 
to, a system taxing asset appreciation as it occurs.13 Nevertheless, the common law 
requirement that a contemporaneous benefit must be received for realization to 
occur still exists.14 
The theme that realization requires the receipt of a contemporaneous benefit has 
been blurred by long-running statutory language associating realization with a mere 
“disposition” of property.15 If realization were truly governed by a disposition 
standard, as the statutory language suggests, a mere transfer of property would be 
sufficient for realization to occur without regard to whether a contemporaneous 
benefit was received. Quite clearly, a mere transfer of property is not sufficient for 
realization under current law because gratuitous transfers of appreciated property 
are not realization events.16 In fact, Congress’s use of the term “disposition” 
                                                                                                                 
in Macomber involving the interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment).  
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 43–48 (discussing how Macomber stands for the 
proposition that realization requires more than a mere transfer, and there must be a receipt of 
a contemporaneous benefit). 
 9. See generally I.R.C. § 61 (2006). The precise timing of income depends on the 
taxpayer’s tax accounting method. See id. § 451(a). 
 10. At a minimum, an increase in the taxpayer’s wealth should increase the taxpayer’s 
borrowing ability. 
 11. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part I.C (outlining the Supreme Court’s retreat from a realization 
requirement that was constitutionally mandated).  
 13. See infra Part I.C (detailing the evolution of the realization requirement from one of 
constitutional dictate to one of administrative convenience).  
 14. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b). 
 15. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (“The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall 
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). This statutory language dates from 1924. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(a), 
43 Stat. 253, 255. 
 16. See Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1954) (confirming Congress 
has not taxed donors on the appreciation in gifted property). President Kennedy proposed to 
tax testamentary and gratuitous transfers of appreciated property in 1963 and the Treasury 
proposed regulations to this effect in 1969, but neither proposal reached fruition. See 
President’s 1963 Tax Message: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 88th 
Cong. 24 (1963) [hereinafter President’s 1963 Tax Message]; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS 
& MEANS AND S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 
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appears to have been a matter of happenstance, rather than being indicative of an 
intention to treat every transfer of property as a realization event.17 
Due to the unprincipled foundation of the realization requirement and the 
nation’s current immense need for revenue,18 the requirement should be 
reexamined to determine how the deferral it confers might be mitigated. The 
current realization requirement causes the tax law to deviate from the economic 
ideal of taxing increases in wealth as they occur.19 To remedy this shortcoming, 
reformers have long advocated adoption of a “mark-to-market” system that taxes 
asset appreciation as it occurs.20 Under such a system, any increase in the value of a 
taxpayer’s assets is taxed as income when it accrues, without regard to when a 
disposition of property occurs. To date, little progress has been made toward a 
mark-to-market system.21 The adoption of a comprehensive mark-to-market system 
has been impeded by: (1) the burden of perpetually valuing the taxpayer’s assets, 
(2) the hardship of imposing tax on an event that does not create liquidity for the 
taxpayer, and (3) the political resistance to a system that would tax “paper gains.”22 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. TREASURY DEPT. 26–32 (Comm. Print 1969). This was not the first time the Treasury 
attempted to tax the donor of appreciated property. See White v. Broderick, 104 F. Supp. 
213, 214 (D. Kan. 1952); I.T. 3910, 1948-1 C.B. 15; I.T. 3932, 1948-2 C.B. 7. See generally 
Note, Gratuitous Disposition of Property as Realization of Income, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1181 
(1949) (discussing the aforementioned IRS rulings). 
 17. See infra Part I.D (noting that a review of the legislative history suggests that use of 
the term “disposition” was not intended to treat every transfer of property as a realization 
event). 
 18. See Policy Experts Revisit VAT as Debt Crisis Looms, 124 TAX NOTES 644, 645 
(2009) (“The fiscal track of the country is unsustainable. . . . The government will have to 
raise more money and control spending.” (quoting Chuck Marr, director of federal tax policy 
at the Center on Budget Policy and Priorities)); Jonathan Weisman & Deborah Solomon, 
What’s News, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. budget deficit was 
revised to a record of nearly $1.6 trillion for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30 and that the 
White House forecast $9 trillion in debt over the next decade).  
 19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 20. For a discussion of mark-to-market systems, see, for example, Fred B. Brown, 
“Complete” Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559 (1996); David J. Shakow, 
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 
(1986); David Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 
76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967); Victor Thuronyi, The Taxation of Corporate Income—A Proposal 
for Reform, 2 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 109 (1983); Mark L. Louie, Note, Realizing Appreciation 
Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
857 (1982). The opposite extreme of accrual taxation would be to defer taxation until 
consumption occurs. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal 
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). This Article does not explore the merits of a 
consumption tax.  
 21. Only a few discrete Code provisions employ economic accrual principles. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 467, 475, 817A, 1271–75, 1296 (2006).  
 22. See infra Part II.B (discussing practical problems presented by a mark-to-market 
system and how a disposition system would alleviate these concerns). “[T]he accrual system 
has never attracted a large group of adherents . . . .” Shakow, supra note 20, at 1113. 
“[B]roader proposals to switch to an accretion system have not met—and most likely will 
not meet—with success.” Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber, supra note 4, at 134. 
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In light of the poor prognosis for a mark-to-market system, this Article 
advocates the adoption of a disposition standard of realization that defers taxation 
only until property is transferred. That is, rather than conditioning realization on the 
receipt of a contemporaneous benefit, a mere transfer of property should be 
sufficient for a realization event. Under the proposed disposition standard, all the 
untaxed appreciation previously shielded by the realization requirement would be 
taxed when the property is transferred.23 Unlike current law, therefore, gratuitous 
inter vivos transfers of appreciated property, as well as death, would constitute 
realization events and thereby terminate the deferral of tax on accrued gains. This 
Article focuses on dispositions of appreciated property, but the proposed 
disposition standard would also apply when property with a basis in excess of value 
is transferred, in which case a loss would be realized.24 
In contrast to the existing realization requirement, a disposition standard for 
realization is fair, efficient, clear, and administrable. This standard is a viable 
second-best alternative to a mark-to-market system. Ironically, the statutory 
“disposition” language long associated with realization, though apparently selected 
by happenstance, would be literally applied under the standard proposed by this 
Article. 
Part I of this Article explores the history of the realization requirement and 
demonstrates that no legal impediment exists to treating the mere transfer of 
property as a realization event. Part II examines the policy implications of a 
disposition standard of realization and shows that such a standard is more equitable 
and efficient than current law, but less administratively and politically problematic 
than a mark-to-market system. Finally, Part III delineates the statutory framework 
to implement a disposition standard of realization and demonstrates how that 
standard would impact current law.  
I. EVOLUTION OF THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT 
Although the realization requirement has long been an integral part of U.S. tax 
law, Congress has yet to clearly define the contours of the requirement. The 
legislative source of the requirement consists of two obtuse statutory provisions 
with long but unremarkable histories. One of these provisions offers as an example 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. This Article also proposes that the transferor’s gain be measured by the value of the 
property transferred (without regard to the nature or amount of consideration received) 
because the value of the transferred property always captures the untaxed appreciation that 
has been shielded by the realization requirement. See infra text accompanying note 129 
(proposing a new statutory rule for quantifying realized gain). The disposition standard for 
realization proposed by this Article would continue to accommodate nonrecognition rules in 
circumstances where Congress makes a policy judgment that the immediate taxation of a 
realized gain is inappropriate. See infra text accompanying notes 155–60.  
 24. Unlike gains, however, losses have no tax effect unless the loss is allowed. See 
I.R.C. § 165(a). Hence, although more losses would be realized under the proposal advanced 
in this Article, the additional losses would not normally be allowed. Moreover, the 
limitations on losses on transactions between related parties would presumably be extended 
to all dispositions of property. See id. § 267(a)(1). 
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of gross income “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.”25 The other provision 
quantifies the resulting income when a realization event occurs: “[t]he gain from 
the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized 
therefrom over the adjusted basis.”26 Neither provision defines the requisite event 
for realization to occur. Nor have the courts filled this gap, as the myriad of 
decisions involving the realization requirement lack an edifying theory.27 
Any effort to reform the realization requirement must necessarily begin with a 
review of its history. This Part, therefore, explores the evolution of the realization 
requirement. As this Part demonstrates, the history of the realization requirement 
should not impede Congress from curtailing the deferral it confers. 
A. The Infancy of Realization—Should Asset Appreciation Ever Be Taxed? 
The contemporary academic debate on the realization requirement does not 
mirror the controversy that existed when the requirement originated. Today, most 
analysts agree that the realization requirement is an undesirable element of the 
income tax, at least in theory, and that an ideal system would not sanction the tax 
deferral conferred by the requirement.28 From this perspective, one might think that 
the realization requirement represented a victory for proponents of tax deferral. 
That is a mistaken view, however, because the realization requirement emerged 
when uncertainty existed as to whether increases in the value of assets that accrued 
in prior years could ever be taxed.29 At that time, the leading alternative to a 
realization-based system was not one where gains would be taxed as they accrued, 
but rather a system where prior years’ accruals would never be taxed, even after 
realization occurred. As such, the establishment of a realization requirement was, at 
the time, a victory for anti-deferral forces who opposed the permanent exclusion of 
asset appreciation from the income tax base.  
The twisted tale of realization began prior to the enactment of the “modern” 
income tax in 1913.30 Shortly after the first U.S. tax was imposed on “income” in 
1861,31 the tax base was expanded to “gains, profits, or income.”32 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Id. § 61(a)(3). 
 26. Id. § 1001(a). 
 27. See infra Part III.B (discussing the common law underlying the realization 
requirement).  
 28. See William D. Andrews, The Achilles Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at 278 (Charls E. Walker & Mark A. 
Bloomfield eds., 1983) (identifying the realization requirement as one of the main culprits for the 
failure to adhere to a comprehensive income tax ideal); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding 
of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 889 (2005) (“The realization requirement destroys the source of 
neutrality of an ideal income tax.”); Deborah H. Schenck, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial 
Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 571, 629 (1995) (“The realization requirement is not an 
inherent characteristic of an income tax. It has no normative role to play . . . .”).  
 29. See MAGILL, supra note 2, at 103–13 (discussing the early history of realization). 
 30. The “modern” income tax refers to the tax laws enacted subsequent to the passage of 
the Sixteenth Amendment allowing a direct income tax without apportionment among the 
states. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.  
 31. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. 
 32. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473; see also CONG. GLOBE, 37TH 
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Court, construing statutory language from the Act of 1867 taxing gains “for” the 
year, ruled that gains that accrued over a series of years could not be taxed in the 
year of sale.33 Rather, only the gain that accrued in the year of sale was within the 
scope of the tax.34 Decades later, the Court reached a different result under the 
Corporate Tax Act of 1909 when, in construing language taxing gains “received” 
during the year, it permitted the taxation of all gains in the year of sale, including 
those that accrued in prior years.35  
After the advent of the modern income tax in 1913, the courts continued to 
struggle with whether gains accrued in prior years could be taxed in the year of 
sale.36 Doubts about taxing prior years’ gains arose once again in 1918 when the 
Court, in dictum, suggested that gains accruing in years prior to the year of sale are 
“not income at all, but merely increase of capital and not subject to a tax as 
income.”37 By 1921, however, the Court eliminated any doubt as to the legitimacy 
of taxing prior years’ appreciation when a sale occurred, stating that “‘[i]ncome 
may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or 
conversion of capital assets.”38 
The realization requirement, therefore, did not emerge as an alternative to taxing 
appreciation as it occurred. Rather, the requirement arose in an environment 
marked by uncertainty as to whether asset appreciation could ever be taxed. By the 
early 1920s, any doubt about taxing prior years’ appreciation had been laid to rest 
as the permanent exemption of accrued gains had been soundly rejected. 
Nevertheless, the fact that courts were mired for decades in the quagmire of 
whether asset appreciation could ever be taxed likely retarded progress that 
otherwise might have been made toward a system that accelerated the taxation of 
accrued gains. 
                                                                                                                 
CONG., 2D SESS. 1531 (1862) (“The words ‘gain’ and ‘income’ mean the same thing.”). 
 33. Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63, 67 (1872). 
 34. Id. at 66. 
 35. Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189, 192 (1918) (applying only to 
gains that accrued after the 1909 Act went into effect); see also Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 
38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (stating that a corporation is subject to an excise tax of one percent of 
“the entire net income . . . received by it from all sources during such year”); T.D. 1571, 12 
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131, 136 (1909) (clarifying that only asset appreciation after January 1, 
1909, is subject to tax). 
 36. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; 50 CONG. REC. 506 (1913) 
(addressing the question of whether gains accrued in prior years are taxed on sale); see also 
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757; Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 
1200, 40 Stat. 300, 329–30; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213, 40 Stat. 1057, 1065.  
 37. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 231 (1918). But see Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage 
Savings Association v. Commissioner: Refining the Concept of Realization, 60 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 437, 438 n.9 (1991) (referencing “taken up on the books” language in a regulation 
promulgated under the Act of 1913 as possible evidence of a mark-to-market element in 
early law). 
 38. Merchs.’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 518 (1921) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920)).  
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B. The Youth of Realization—The Necessity of a Contemporaneous Benefit 
The emergence of the realization requirement can be seen as a victory for anti-
deferral forces relative to the alternative of exempting asset appreciation from tax. 
That victory, however, was short lived. In 1920, the Supreme Court, in Eisner v. 
Macomber,39 constrained the range of realization events by limiting realization to 
circumstances in which the transferor of appreciated property received a 
contemporaneous benefit. 
In Macomber, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the scope of 
“income” in the Sixteenth Amendment which gave Congress the power “to lay and 
collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived.”40 The government sought 
to enforce a provision of the Revenue Act of 1916 stating that a “stock dividend 
shall be considered income.”41 Searching for a clear definition of income, the 
Supreme Court embraced a definition adopted by earlier courts under the Corporate 
Tax Act of 1909: “‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from 
labor, or from both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained 
through a sale or conversion of capital assets.”42 The government invoked this 
definition of income when it argued that a stock dividend was income. The Court 
nevertheless criticized the government for emphasizing the word “gain” in the 
definition “while the significance of the next three words [‘derived from capital’] 
was either overlooked or misconceived.”43 The Court found that the “derived from 
capital” language was indicative of a realization requirement:  
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a 
growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, 
something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, 
severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, 
being “derived,” that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the 
taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;—that is income 
derived from property. . . .  
 The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the 
Sixteenth Amendment—“incomes, from whatever source derived . . . .”44 
The Court’s description of the realization requirement reveals that realization 
requires more than a mere transfer of property; the receipt of a contemporaneous 
benefit by the transferor is an integral part of the requirement. Hence, the fact that 
the property owner’s wealth increased when the appreciation occurred was not 
sufficient to impose a tax when the property was transferred. Rather, the Court tied 
realization to “something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, . . . 
and coming in, being . . . received or drawn by the recipient.”45 This language 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 41. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757. 
 42. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 44. Id. (emphasis in original, some emphasis added). 
 45. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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inextricably linked the receipt of a contemporaneous benefit to the transfer of the 
underlying property in order to establish a realization event.46 
Four years after the Macomber decision, Congress effectively crystallized the 
contemporaneous-benefit requirement in the Revenue Act of 1924. Although this 
legislation refrained from defining a realization event, it provided the following 
formula for computing gain: “[T]he gain from the sale or other disposition of 
property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the basis . . . .”47 
The 1924 Act then defined amount realized as follows: “The amount realized from 
the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received 
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received.”48 By 
defining amount realized based on the consideration received by the transferor 
(rather than the value of the property transferred), Congress established a 
realization framework incorporating the receipt of a contemporaneous benefit. That 
same framework still exists today.49 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. The contemporaneous consideration requirement for realization is reinforced by a 
Treasury regulation promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1918. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. 
Int. Rev. 170, 393 (1919) (“Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent 
disposition of property is realized when as the result of a transaction . . . the property is 
converted into cash or into property . . . .”); see also T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 207, 
498–99 (1922) (containing similar language but promulgated under the Revenue Act of 
1921).  
 47. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(a), 43 Stat. 253, 255 (emphasis added). The 
committee report provides: “There is no provision of the existing law which corresponds to 
this section of the bill. The purpose in embodying in the law this section is to show clearly 
the method of determining the amount of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of 
property.” H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 12 (1924), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938–1861, at 684 (Prentice-Hall 
1938). 
 48. Revenue Act of 1924 § 202(c) (emphasis added). The Revenue Acts prior to 1918 
merely included “gain from sales or dealings in property” in the definition of income without 
any guidance as to when and how such gain was measured. See Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 
II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167–68 (“[T]he net income of a taxable person shall include gains [from] 
. . . sales[] or dealings in property . . . .”); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 
757 (same). The Revenue Act of 1918 provided that in the case of an exchange of properties, 
“the property received in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be 
treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any . . . .” Revenue 
Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060. Three years later, Congress converted the 
rule to one of recognition. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (“[O]n 
an exchange of property . . . for any other such property, no gain or loss shall be recognized 
unless the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value . . . .”). 
Congress retreated from the market value standard in 1924 when it enacted the definition of 
amount realized that still applies today. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (2006). The committee report to the 
1924 Act explained that the amendment was made due to the difficulty of determining 
whether property has a readily realizable market value. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 13 
(1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 47, at 686; S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 13–14 (1924), 
reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 47, at 686–87. 
 49. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b) (2006). 
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C. The Maturity of Realization—Erosion of the  
Contemporaneous Benefit Requirement 
After the Macomber decision, the realization requirement appeared to be a 
constitutional requirement mandating the transfer of property in exchange for 
contemporaneous consideration. The requirement, however, continued to evolve. 
By 1940, the Court had retreated from the Macomber standard and regarded 
realization as a mere administrative rule establishing when the deferral conferred 
on asset appreciation should terminate. 
In Helvering v. Bruun,50 the Supreme Court retreated from its earlier view that a 
separation of income from capital was a prerequisite to a realization event. In 
Bruun, a landlord leased a lot and building under a ninety-nine-year lease during 
which the tenant erected a new building on the site.51 Shortly thereafter, the tenant 
defaulted and the landlord took possession of the land and the new building.52 The 
government sought to tax the landlord on the difference between the value of the 
reclaimed property and the landlord’s basis in the property.53 The lower courts held 
for the landlord, finding that the added value could not be taxed until the landlord 
disposed of the property because the added value “is not gain derived from capital 
or realized within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.”54 The Supreme Court 
reversed, stating:  
While it is true that economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is 
settled that the realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the 
sale of an asset. . . . The fact that the gain is a portion of the value of 
property received by the taxpayer in the transaction does not negative 
its realization. . . . It is not necessary to recognition of taxable gain that 
[the taxpayer] should be able to sever the improvement . . . from his 
original capital.55 
The Bruun Court’s opinion marked a dramatic retreat from the standard for 
realization previously set by Macomber. As Professors Bittker and Lokken have 
stated: 
Although the Bruun opinion did not reject the famous definition 
promulgated by Eisner v. Macomber, it watered down the requirement 
of a realization by suggesting that any definite event—here the 
forfeiture of a leasehold—could properly be employed as the occasion 
for taking account of the taxpayer’s gain.56  
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. 309 U.S. 461 (1940). 
 51. Id. at 464. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 464–65. 
 54. Id. at 467. 
 55. Id. at 469. Congress subsequently overruled the Bruun holding. See I.R.C. § 109 
(2006). 
 56. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS ¶ 5.1 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis added).  
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A mere eight months after the Bruun decision, the Supreme Court explicitly 
acknowledged that the realization rule was founded on “administrative 
convenience.” 57 In Helvering v. Horst, a father gave the interest coupons from a 
coupon bond to his son.58 The government sought to tax the father on the interest 
payments collected by the son.59 The lower courts reached conflicting results, but 
the Supreme Court held that the father could indeed be taxed.60 The Court 
elaborated on the realization rule as follows:  
The [realization] rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only 
one of postponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the 
income, usually the receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of 
exemption from taxation where the enjoyment is consummated by 
some event other than the taxpayer’s personal receipt of money or other 
property.61  
Although Horst dealt with interest income rather than income in the form of 
asset appreciation, the Court retreated from the Macomber Court’s view of 
realization as a general matter by finding that realization is based on administrative 
convenience.62 Moreover, the Court continues to adhere to this view. As recently as 
1991, the Court reiterated its view that “the concept of realization is ‘founded on 
administrative convenience.’”63 Thus, the strictures imposed on the realization 
requirement by Macomber have been significantly relaxed.64 
Now that the Macomber Court’s view of realization has been relaxed, the 
antiquated statutory scheme that germinated from Macomber lacks conceptual 
support.65 That scheme conditions realization on the receipt of an economic 
benefit—gain is measured by the amount realized, by what comes in.66 But if the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Helvering v. Horst (Horst III), 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940). 
 58. Id. at 114. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 120. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the tax. Horst v. Comm’r (Horst I), 
39 B.T.A. 757, 761 (1939). The Second Circuit later reversed. Horst v. Comm’r (Horst II), 
107 F.2d 906, 908 (1939). 
 61. Horst III, 311 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (quoting Horst III, 311 
U.S. at 116). 
 64. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ¶ 5.01 (11th ed. 2009) 
(“[R]ealization is strictly an administrative rule and not a constitutional, much less an 
economic requirement, of ‘income.’”); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Current Conceptions of 
Taxable Income, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 151, 176 (1964) (“[I]t appears that as a constitutional 
prerequisite realization is no longer required . . . .”); Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court 
and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 
NW. U. 779, 791 (1941) (“[T]he formalistic doctrine of realization proclaimed by [Eisner v. 
Macomber] is not a constitutional mandate.”). But see generally Henry Ordower, Revisiting 
Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. 
TAX REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that realization remains a constitutional prerequisite for the 
taxation of gains from property).  
 65. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b) (2006); supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
 66. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b); supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
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realization requirement is merely a matter of administrative convenience, 
realization need not be conditioned on the receipt of a contemporaneous benefit. 
Rather, Congress has the power to terminate the deferral of tax on accrued gains at 
any convenient time. 
If Congress were to reject the contemporaneous benefit requirement for 
purposes of establishing a realization event, no compelling reason would exist to 
perpetuate the amount realized construct of current law, which looks to the 
consideration received by the transferor to quantify the transferor’s gain. When 
realization occurs, gain should logically be measured by the value of the property 
transferred, without regard to the amount of consideration received, because the 
value of the transferred property captures all the untaxed appreciation that 
previously accrued. Unfortunately, Congress has yet to modernize the statutory 
scheme and establish a rational standard for realization that would mitigate the tax 
deferral conferred by current law. 
D. A Parallel Strand—Is a “Disposition” Sufficient for Realization? 
In light of the Supreme Court’s finding that the realization requirement was 
founded on administrative convenience, Congress is now able to terminate the 
deferral of tax on asset appreciation when property is transferred, regardless of 
whether a contemporaneous benefit is received by the transferor. One might be 
tempted to bolster the case for this result by highlighting the statutory language 
dating to 1924 that quantifies gain from the “sale or other disposition” of 
property.67 A “disposition” of property is generally understood to encompass any 
transfer of property regardless of whether consideration is received by the 
transferor.68 If the use of the term “disposition” by Congress manifested an intent to 
tax all accrued appreciation as soon as property is transferred, then one might argue 
that existing law already incorporates the disposition standard proposed by this 
Article. The legislative history reveals, however, that Congress’s use of the term 
“disposition” was apparently a matter of happenstance. The presence of the term in 
the statute does not support the view that current law incorporates a true disposition 
standard for realization. 
The statutory phrase “sale or other disposition” first appeared in the Revenue 
Act of 1916, in a basis provision, without any explanation as to why Congress 
chose the term “disposition” or what that term was thought to mean.69 Eight years 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (“The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall 
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). This statutory language dates from 1924. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(a), 
43 Stat. 253, 255. 
 68. Herbert’s Estate v. Comm’r, 139 F.2d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1943) (“The dictionary 
definition of ‘disposition’ is . . . ‘[t]he getting rid, or making over, of anything . . . .’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 69. “For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale or other disposition 
of property . . . the fair market price or value of such property as of March first, nineteen 
hundred and thirteen, shall be the basis for determining the amount of such gain derived.” 
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(c), 39 Stat. 756, 758. In subsequent revenue acts, 
Congress continued to use the term “disposition” without defining it. See Revenue Act of 
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later, in section 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress first employed the 
“sale or other disposition” standard to quantify gain or loss after a realization event 
occurs.70 That same statutory standard still applies for this purpose today.71 The 
Committee Reports to section 202(a) state: 
There is no provision of the existing law which corresponds to this 
section of the bill. The purpose in embodying in the law this section is 
to show clearly the method of determining the amount of gain or loss 
from the sale or other disposition of property.  
 . . . This merely embodies in the law the present construction by the 
department and the courts of the existing law.72 
This legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend to define the contours 
of realization when the statutory term “disposition” was introduced. 
Not surprisingly, Congress’s use of the term “disposition” in connection with 
quantifying gain has generated much confusion over the years. Indeed, some courts 
have interpreted the term to mean that any transfer of property constitutes a 
realization event.73 Although the statutory term “disposition” has applied to the 
computation of gain for more than eighty years, that term has no bearing on the 
requirements for a realization event.74 While Congress could mitigate the tax 
                                                                                                                 
1918, ch. 18, § 202(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(b), 42 Stat. 
227, 229. The Committee Reports to the 1916 Act indicate that the provision responds to the 
judicial uncertainty concerning the taxation of gains accrued in prior years when realization 
occurs. See 53 CONG. REC. 13407–08 (1916), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 47, at 958–
59. The legislative history to the 1921 Act indicates that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Merchants’ Loan made it “necessary” for Congress to articulate a more detailed statement of 
the general rule that the basis for determining gain or loss for property acquired prior to 
March 1, 1913, is the value of the property as of that date. H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 9 (1921), 
reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 47, at 787. 
 70. Revenue Act of 1924 § 202(a). 
 71. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b) (2006). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 12 (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 47, at 684. 
The language appeared in similar form in early Treasury decisions. T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. 
Dec. Int. Rev. 186 (1918) (including the “sale or other disposition” language in both the 
basis rule and the gain computation rule whereas statutes only used the language in the basis 
rule); T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 176 (1919) (addressing the definition of net 
income); T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 220 (using the “sale or other disposition” 
language in the basis rules but using “sale or conversion” language to define income under 
the Revenue Act of 1921); T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 751, 755 (using the “sale or 
other disposition” language in the meaning of net income, the “sale or conversion” language 
for gross income, and the “sale or other disposition” language with respect to determining 
the amount of gain or loss). Since 1934, however, the regulations have not used the term 
“disposition” but instead refer to “conversion of property into cash” and “exchange of 
property for other property.” Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 n.6 
(1991) (emphasis added). 
 73. See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (noting that some courts have treated 
a charitable contribution of appreciated property as a realization event).  
 74. See 1 STANLEY S. SURREY, WILLIAM C. WARREN, PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. 
AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 818 (Harry W. Jones et al. eds., 
Foundation Press 1972) (“Section 1001(a) governs the computation of the amount of gain or 
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deferral conferred by current law by adopting a disposition standard of realization, 
it has not previously employed that standard. Whether it is desirable for Congress 
to now adopt a disposition standard of realization depends largely on the policy 
implications of doing so, a subject that is explored in Part II. 
II. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A DISPOSITION STANDARD FOR REALIZATION 
Under current law, realization is deferred until appreciated property is 
transferred for a tangible benefit.75 The realization requirement is inequitable 
because the deferral it confers causes asset appreciation to be taxed more favorably 
than other forms of income.76 In addition, the realization requirement is inefficient 
because it creates an incentive to invest in property generating economic returns in 
the form of asset appreciation and thereby distorts investment decisions.77 For these 
reasons, Congress can and should retreat from the tax deferral sanctioned by 
current law. 
Commentators have long argued that the realization requirement should be 
eliminated in favor of a mark-to-market system that taxes asset appreciation as it 
accrues, consistent with the economist’s definition of income.78 Such a system 
would eliminate the inequity and inefficiency of a realization based system by 
terminating the tax deferral current law confers on asset appreciation.79 However, 
mark-to-market taxation presents serious administrative and political hurdles with 
regard to measuring income and taxing “paper gains.”80 
In contrast to a mark-to-market system, the disposition standard of realization 
proposed by this Article would curtail the inequity and inefficiency of current law 
while minimizing the administrative and political issues posed by a system that 
taxes gains as they accrue. Under a disposition standard, the deferral of accrued 
gains would be terminated whenever property is transferred, without regard to 
whether a contemporaneous benefit is conferred on the transferor. Moreover, the 
transferor’s gain would be measured by reference to the value of the property 
transferred, without regard to the amount of consideration received. The value of 
the transferred property should measure the transferor’s gain because that value 
captures all the untaxed appreciation that previously accrued.  
If Congress were to adopt a disposition standard of realization, current law 
would change in two major ways. First, any inter vivos gratuitous transfer would 
                                                                                                                 
loss from the sale or other disposition of property. This section does not determine the 
inclusion of gains or the amount allowance of losses. Rather, it relates to gains which have 
qualified for inclusion under section 61(a) as a result of the construction of that 
section . . . .”) (emphasis omitted)). 
 75. See supra Part I (summarizing the current status of the realization requirement). 
 76. See infra Part II.A.1 (describing how the realization requirement causes income in 
the form of asset appreciation to be more favorably taxed). 
 77. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing how the realization requirement affects investment 
decisions thereby decreasing economic efficiency). 
 78. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 79. See infra Part II.A.1–2 (explaining how a mark-to-market system would eliminate 
the inequity and inefficiency created by the realization requirement). 
 80. See infra Part II.B (discussing the administrative and political issues presented by a 
mark-to-market system). 
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constitute a realization event so that gifts and charitable contributions of 
appreciated property would trigger a tax on the appreciation when the transfer 
occurs. Second, death would be a realization event thereby causing the gain on all 
appreciated assets to be taxed at the time of death. Other less significant changes in 
the law would also result from a disposition standard.81 
This Part demonstrates that a disposition standard of realization would mitigate 
the inequity and inefficiency created by the existing realization requirement. In 
addition, a disposition standard of realization would pose less serious 
administrative problems and political concerns than a mark-to-market system. 
Finally, a disposition standard would dramatically simplify current law. 
A. Disposition Standard Mitigates Inequity and Inefficiency of Current Law 
By virtue of the realization requirement, the tax on asset appreciation is deferred 
until property is transferred for a contemporaneous benefit. As such, the income tax 
system confers preferred treatment on asset appreciation relative to other economic 
benefits which are taxed when they occur. The favorable tax treatment of asset 
appreciation adversely impacts the equity and the efficiency of the tax system. 
These shortcomings could be mitigated by enacting a rule that treats any transfer of 
property as a realization event without regard to the consideration, if any, received 
by the transferor.  
1. Equity Considerations 
From a fairness standpoint, similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed alike 
regardless of the sources of their income.82 Generally, income is deemed to occur 
when an economic benefit is derived.83 For example, income from labor is taxed 
when the benefit is derived by the service performer; namely, when compensation 
is received.84 Similarly, periodic income from capital (e.g., interest and dividends) 
is taxed on receipt.85 In the case of asset appreciation, a benefit is derived when the 
appreciation occurs because the taxpayer’s wealth increases at that time.86 The tax 
on that benefit is deferred, however, until realization occurs.87 In addition to 
deferring the tax on accrued gains, current law permits those gains to be shifted to 
other taxpayers when inter vivos gifts occur.88 Moreover, current law eliminates 
accrued gains without taxing them when appreciated property is transferred to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. For example, the destruction and theft of property could constitute realization 
events. See infra Part III.B.9. 
 82. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC 
ECONOMY 160 (1959).  
 83. See JAMES J. FREELAND, DANIEL J. LATHROPE, STEPHEN A. LIND & RICHARD B. 
STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 46–47 (15th ed. 2009). 
 84. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006). 
 85. See id. § 61(a)(4), (7). 
 86. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 87. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a). 
 88. See id. § 1015 (providing that a donee receiving a gift of appreciated property takes 
a transferred basis). 
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charity or held until death.89 Hence, asset appreciation is taxed more favorably than 
other forms of income. 
The ability to defer the tax on asset appreciation confers a benefit on the 
taxpayer due to the time-value of money, a benefit not enjoyed by recipients of 
other forms of income.90 Consequently, horizontal equity, the notion that all 
taxpayers with a like amount of income should be taxed alike, is violated by the 
realization requirement.91 A taxpayer with income in the form of gains from 
property bears less of a tax burden than a taxpayer with a like amount of income 
from other sources. 
The realization requirement also violates vertical equity, the principle that 
higher income taxpayers should be taxed more heavily than lower income 
taxpayers.92 In all likelihood, the benefits of the deferral conferred by the 
realization requirement accrue disproportionately to the wealthy because wealthier 
taxpayers tend to own greater amounts of capital.93 To the extent that wealthier 
taxpayers benefit disproportionately from the realization requirement, vertical 
equity is violated.  
These inequities could be remedied by eliminating the realization requirement 
and substituting a mark-to-market tax system. A mark-to-market system would tax 
asset appreciation when the taxpayer’s wealth increased, like the taxation of all 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. See id. § 1014 (eliminating appreciation in property transferred at death by 
establishing a fair-market-value basis in the property). Section 1014 does not apply in 2010 
but automatically returns in 2011. See id. § 1014(f); Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a)–(b), 115 Stat. 150 (sunset 
provision). In 2010, the step-up in basis at death is limited to $1.3 million and an additional 
$3 million for property transferred to a surviving spouse. See I.R.C. § 1022. 
 90. In this context, the time-value of money accounts for the economic differential 
between incurring a tax liability as property appreciates and incurring a tax liability in the 
future when appreciated property is sold. Deferring realization reduces the present value or 
cost of the taxpayer’s tax liability because “taxpayers are not charged interest for the 
resulting deferral of their tax payments.” Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying 
the Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53, 58 (2003). For 
additional discussion on the time-value of money, see Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. 
Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 
TAX L. REV. 565 (1983). The time-value of money benefit could be neutralized by imposing 
an interest charge on the deferred tax, but such an approach would add much complexity to 
the law. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 
167 (1991). 
 91. The principle of horizontal equity, that taxpayers in similar positions should be 
treated equally, is “[p]erhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation . . . .” 
MUSGRAVE, supra note 82, at 160. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Engler & Knoll, supra note 90, at 58–59 (noting that the realization requirement not 
only creates discrimination across asset classes, but also creates discrimination across 
taxpayers, because taxpayers who can hold onto appreciated assets longer, typically wealthy 
individuals, “disproportionately reduce their income tax burden relative to those with lesser 
deferral opportunities”).  
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other forms of income.94 As such, asset appreciation would no longer be tax-
favored from a timing perspective and the resulting inequity would disappear.95 
In contrast to a mark-to-market system, the proposed disposition standard would 
still foster inequities because the tax on accrued gains would be deferred until a 
disposition occurs. The disposition standard would nevertheless improve current 
law by curtailing the disproportionate benefits now conferred on asset appreciation. 
Under a disposition standard, it would no longer be possible to defer or escape tax 
by making an inter vivos gift of appreciated property or transferring such property 
at death. These transfers would constitute realization events under a disposition 
standard of realization. As a result, a disposition standard would reduce the 
disparity between the tax treatment of asset appreciation and income from other 
sources. Thus, the implementation of a disposition standard for realization would 
mitigate, but not eliminate, the inequities of current law.  
2. Efficiency Considerations 
To maximize efficiency, a tax should be designed so as not to distort an 
investment decision that would normally be driven by economic considerations.96 
The U.S. tax system taxes periodic investment returns (e.g., dividends, interest) 
when they occur.97 By contrast, asset appreciation is not taxed until realization 
occurs.98 The deferral conferred by the realization requirement creates a tax 
incentive to invest in property generating economic returns in the form of asset 
appreciation. As such, the realization requirement likely causes investment dollars 
to be allocated differently from how those dollars would be allocated if asset 
appreciation were taxed as it occurred. Thus, the realization requirement distorts 
investment decisions and thereby fosters inefficiency. 
In addition to distorting initial investment decisions, the realization requirement 
creates a “lock-in” effect after appreciating assets are acquired.99 When an acquired 
asset appreciates in value, an owner who would normally sell the asset based on 
economic considerations will be less likely to sell the asset because the sale would 
trigger the deferred tax on the asset appreciation. This lock-in effect is exacerbated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. See supra note 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 95. In addition to the deferral conferred on asset appreciation, such appreciation is also 
often subject to favorable capital gains tax rates. See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231, 1(h) (2006). The 
characterization benefits accorded asset appreciation are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 96. When a tax causes an economic decision to be made differently from how it would 
have been made in the absence of the tax, the taxpayer generally bears a burden in excess of 
the tax itself. The tax creates inefficiency because it makes one person worse off without 
conferring a corresponding benefit on anyone else. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. 
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 279–91 (5th ed. 1989).  
 97. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4), (7) (2006). 
 98. See id. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a).  
 99. See David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1610 (1998) 
(explaining the lock-in effect). The reduced tax rates that apply to capital gains mitigate 
lock-in to some extent. See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a 
Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 350 (1993); Schizer, supra at 1611; supra 
note 95. 
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by the fact that gains accruing to property can be deferred and ultimately eliminated 
by holding property until death.100 The fact that death does not constitute a 
realization event under current law creates a strong tax incentive to hold assets 
longer than they would otherwise be held if the decision to transfer assets were 
based solely on economic considerations.101 Hence, not only does the realization 
requirement distort the initial investment decision, but it also distorts the decision 
to reallocate investment dollars as time passes, further undermining the efficiency 
of the tax system. 
The inefficiencies caused by the realization requirement would be eliminated 
under a mark-to-market system. If asset appreciation were taxed as it accrued, 
property owners could no longer control the time when asset appreciation would be 
taxed. As a result, the timing of the taxation of accrued gains would be consistent 
with the timing of the taxation of other types of investment income. Thus, the 
decision to invest in appreciating assets would not be influenced by tax 
considerations stemming from the deferral of tax on asset appreciation. 
A mark-to-market system would also eliminate current law’s lock-in effect 
because the act of transferring property would no longer trigger a tax. Rather, asset 
appreciation would be taxed when it occurred (with a corresponding step up in the 
basis of the asset to market value to reflect that the appreciation was taxed) and 
thereby eliminate any gain on the subsequent disposition of the asset. Thus, the 
decision to retain or sell an asset would be solely a function of economic 
considerations without regard to tax effects. 
Unlike a mark-to-market system, a disposition standard for realization would not 
eliminate all the inefficiencies of current law. Those inefficiencies should be 
mitigated, however, if the realization requirement is curtailed by no longer 
conditioning realization on the receipt of a contemporaneous benefit. Although the 
tax on asset appreciation would still be deferred until property was transferred, 
avenues that now exist to escape or shift the taxation of accrued gains (namely, 
testamentary and inter vivos gratuitous transfers) would be closed. As a result, the 
tax incentive to invest in appreciating assets relative to other investment 
alternatives would be reduced. 
Implementation of a disposition standard would have a less predictable impact 
on the lock-in effect of current law. Under a disposition standard, death would 
constitute a realization event. Treating death as a realization event would eliminate 
the tax incentive to hold property until death by ensuring an eventual tax on all 
gains. This change from current law should reduce the lock-in effect. However, a 
disposition standard would also trigger gains when inter vivos gifts of appreciated 
property occur. The elimination of the tax incentive to make gratuitous lifetime 
transfers of appreciated property could exacerbate the lock-in effect by 
discouraging gifts. On the other hand, the disposition standard would eliminate the 
benefit conferred by current law on a gift of appreciated property; namely, the 
ability of the donor to extend the deferral period (to the life of the donee) and shift 
the potential future tax burden to another taxpayer. Hence, the gap between the 
burdens imposed on different forms of income would diminish. Consequently, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See I.R.C. § 1014. But see supra note 89. 
 101. Estate taxes will sometimes encourage transfers of property before death.  
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property owners might be more inclined to transfer appreciated assets knowing that 
a tax will eventually be imposed. These cross currents create some uncertainty as to 
the actual impact of the proposed disposition standard on current law’s lock-in 
effect.102  
Quite clearly, a disposition standard for realization would reduce the disparity 
between the treatment of asset appreciation and other forms of income by 
eliminating outlets that now exist for a taxpayer to escape tax on asset appreciation. 
By mitigating the favorable tax treatment of asset appreciation, the tax incentive to 
invest in appreciating assets should decline, thereby furthering economic 
efficiency. Although it is unclear how a disposition standard will impact the lock-in 
effect, that element of the equation should not neutralize the systemic gains 
achieved by mitigating the distortions created by current law.  
B. Disposition Standard Mitigates Administrative and  
Political Problems Posed by a Mark-to-Market System 
As previously discussed, a realization requirement of any sort undermines the 
equity and efficiency of the tax system. Although a mark-to-market system does 
not share these weaknesses, it presents problems involving valuation, liquidity, and 
political acceptability. In addition to ameliorating the inequities and inefficiencies 
of current law, a disposition standard for realization would mitigate the problems 
posed by a mark-to-market system. 
1. Valuation 
Under a mark-to-market system, each taxpayer must report as income the annual 
increase in the value of that taxpayer’s assets.103 To determine this amount, all 
assets must be appraised each year. The appraised value of each asset must be 
compared to that of the prior year and the difference would result in a gain (or a 
loss) on the tax return.104 Requiring an annual appraisal of all assets would 
undoubtedly be burdensome.105 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. If death were treated as a realization event but inter vivos gifts were not treated as 
such, it is unclear whether the lock-in effect would be diminished. If taxpayers knew that 
appreciated property could be gratuitously transferred before death without triggering a tax 
on the appreciation, they might procrastinate with respect to making gifts, believing death is 
not imminent, with many failing to make gifts before death occurred. 
 103. See Shakow, supra note 20, at 1112 (“[T]he accretion ideal . . . [entails] including 
unrealized changes in the value of property in taxable income.”) (quoting Professor William 
D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1113, 1115–16 (1974) (omission added)). 
 104. Id. (“Literal achievement of [the accretion ideal] would require that all assets be 
taken into account at current fair market value at the end of each accounting period.”). 
 105. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Commentary, It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 
607 (2000) (discussing the difficult valuation issues posed by a mark-to-market system). 
Certain proposals would permit less frequent appraisals, except certain assets, and allow for 
estimates. See Shakow, supra note 20, at 1120 (“[A] practical system for accrual taxation 
should not require valuation of every asset owned by every taxpayer.”). 
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In contrast to a mark-to-market system, a system taxing asset appreciation upon 
disposition would not require an annual valuation of every asset. Rather, each asset 
owned by any taxpayer would be valued only once, when the asset is transferred. 
At that time, the transferor would be taxed on the difference between the value of 
the asset and its basis, regardless of whether a contemporaneous benefit is received. 
The novel valuation challenges presented by a disposition standard of realization 
involve death and inter vivos gifts.106 Because death would become a realization 
event under a disposition standard, the property of the decedent must be valued at 
death to quantify the resulting gains (and losses).107 Valuing property at death, 
however, is not a foreign concept—a decedent’s assets must often be valued for 
purposes of federal and state estate taxes and inheritance taxes.108 In addition to 
requiring the valuation of assets at death, a disposition standard would require the 
valuation of assets when lifetime gifts occur. Here too, valuing gifts is not an 
entirely foreign concept in that federal and state transfer taxes are sometimes 
imposed on gifts.109  
In addition to requiring less frequent asset valuations, a system that requires 
property to be valued when an inter vivos or testamentary gratuitous transfer occurs 
should be perceived as less artificial than a mark-to-market system. In the case of a 
mark-to-market system, it is unlikely that a property owner would independently 
contemplate the value of her assets on the specific day each year that the tax law 
required assets to be valued. No economic reason would exist for the owner to be 
focused on the value of the assets on that arbitrary date. The annual valuation of all 
assets would be driven solely by the tax system and would undoubtedly be 
burdensome. 
In contrast to a mark-to-market system, a disposition standard of realization 
would trigger valuation at a time when the property owner is likely to be 
considering the property’s actual value. When property is transferred, the transferor 
will normally confront the question of valuation regardless of whether the tax 
system mandates valuation at the time of transfer. For example, when a donor 
decides to make a gift, the donor will normally determine the amount of the gift 
before making it. In the case of a cash gift, the donor must decide a specific amount 
to give (unless she simply reaches into her pocket and hands over a wad of cash). In 
the case of a gift of property, the donor is also likely to go through a mental process 
of valuing the property before she conveys it. Although a donor would not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. Charitable contributions do not present a new valuation challenge because they must 
be valued to determine the magnitude of the taxpayer’s deduction. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006).  
 107. See supra note 24 (discussing the limitations on allowing losses even if they are 
realized under the proposed disposition standard).  
 108. See I.R.C. § 2001; ELIZABETH C. MCNICHOL, CENT. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, MANY STATES ARE DECOUPLING FROM THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX CUT (Revised 
Mar. 28, 2006) (referencing the more than twenty states that impose estate or inheritance 
taxes).  
 109. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2502; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §12-640 (West 2005); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-8-101 (2006). In many cases, gifts of property over a nominal 
amount tend to be in forms that are not that hard to value like publicly traded securities or 
real estate (though real estate can sometimes be difficult to value). 
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normally secure a professional appraisal of the gifted property,110 the donor 
undoubtedly will engage in a conscious or unconscious exercise of determining that 
the property in question is within a range of values that the donor is inclined to 
bestow on a particular donee. If a donor is inclined to make a gift of roughly 
$1,000, she might transfer property with a value of $800 or $1,200 to the donee, but 
it is highly unlikely she will transfer property worth $5,000 to the donee. Thus, a 
donor who makes a gift of a particular property presumably makes the gift because 
the value of the property approximates the amount of the gift the donor wishes to 
make. Because the time of transfer is normally a time when a property owner will 
confront the valuation question regardless of tax effects, the infrequent valuations 
required by a disposition standard of realization should be less artificial, and thus 
less onerous, than the arbitrary annual valuations mandated by a mark-to-market 
system. 
A realization requirement triggered by a disposition standard would entail a one-
time valuation of the property, at the time of disposition, rather than the annual 
valuations required by a mark-to-market system.111 Moreover, a system tying 
realization to a disposition would require valuation at a time when the taxpayer 
would likely be focused on valuation for non-tax reasons. Hence, a realization 
requirement that defers taxation of appreciated property until a disposition occurs 
should pose fewer valuation problems than a mark-to-market system. 
2. Liquidity 
Under a mark-to-market system, tax would be imposed annually on the asset 
appreciation that accrues each year the taxpayer owns the property. The event 
triggering the tax (the passage of a year) would not generate cash with which to pay 
the tax. One criticism of a mark-to-market system, therefore, is that it imposes tax 
at a time unrelated to a transaction providing the taxpayer with the cash to pay the 
tax.112 Thus, a mark-to-market system would create liquidity issues for taxpayers.  
Of course, liquidity issues already exist under current law. For example, under 
current law, value received is normally taxed regardless of its form—one need not 
be paid in money to have income.113 If a taxpayer is compensated with property, the 
taxpayer is taxed on the value of the property received. The fact that the taxpayer 
received no money to pay the tax is not the concern of the tax system. Many 
realization events under current law do not involve the receipt of money by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. This statement contemplates a gift to the object of one’s bounty rather than to 
charity. In the case of a gift to charity, an appraisal might be needed to support the 
corresponding income tax deduction. See I.R.C. § 170. 
 111. See Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach is Superior to Carryover 
Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REV. 421, 
434 (2001) (“Deeming realization to occur at death (or upon gift) would impose a one-time 
valuation and liquidity problem, as opposed to annual valuations, and in that respect would 
be similar to federal transfer taxes.”). 
 112. See Schenk, supra note 4, at 360–65 (discussing the liquidity concerns surrounding 
a mark-to-market system). 
 113. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2010) (“Gross income includes income realized in any 
form, whether in money, property, or services.”). 
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transferor. For example, a deferred payment sale, an exchange of one property for 
another, and an exchange of property for services constitute realization events even 
if no cash is received when the property is transferred.114 
Admittedly, a disposition standard for realization not conditioned on the receipt 
of tangible value would likely create more liquidity issues than current law. A 
disposition standard would tax inter vivos and testamentary gratuitous transfers 
with respect to which no consideration is received. Nevertheless, a disposition 
standard of realization would create less of a liquidity problem than a mark-to-
market system because taxes are imposed less frequently. Under a disposition 
standard, tax is imposed only once on each property owned by the taxpayer, at the 
time the property is transferred. By contrast, under a mark-to-market system, the 
appreciation in all assets would be taxed every year for as long as the property is 
owned. Hence, fewer liquidity issues should be posed by a realization requirement 
based on a disposition of property standard than by a mark-to-market system. 
Moreover, the liquidity issues that would be presented by a disposition standard 
could be relieved by Congress in appropriate cases.115 
3. Political Feasibility 
Significant political resistance to the elimination of the realization requirement 
is also likely to impede the advent of a mark-to-market system. The view that 
“paper gains” should not be taxed is firmly embedded in the current culture, and it 
would be very difficult to mobilize popular support for a system that taxes asset 
appreciation as it occurs.116 This reason alone is likely to preclude a comprehensive 
mark-to-market system from ever being implemented in the United States. 
Some degree of resistance is also likely to exist with respect to implementing a 
disposition standard for realization. Many will likely object to taxing the 
appreciation in lifetime gifts and testamentary transfers of property. Tying taxation 
to the physical transfer of property, however, should be less objectionable than a 
mark-to-market system, at least in the case of lifetime transfers. Under a disposition 
standard of realization, the taxpayer can still avoid being taxed on paper profits 
during the taxpayer’s lifetime by retaining ownership of the taxpayer’s property. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. To the extent liquidity issues do exist, various relief mechanisms could be employed 
to mitigate the adverse effects. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 453 (2006) (granting deferral of income 
under the installment method); id. § 6166 (granting relief from estate tax when estate 
consists largely of interest in closely held business).  
 115. See Kornhauser, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 4, at 54 (stating that liquidity 
problems created by taxing appreciated property transferred gratuitously are not unique and 
that Congress can grant relief similar to that conferred on sales of closely held businesses 
and farms). It is true that the magnitude of the single gain and corresponding tax liability 
under a disposition standard would often be much greater than the annual gains under a 
mark-to-market system, but relief measures could be molded to address this situation. 
 116. See Schenk, supra note 4, at 377–78 (suggesting that people do not view paper 
profits as income); Schizer, supra note 99, at 1606 (stating that an attempt to repeal 
realization “would create . . . a firestorm of political opposition”) (quoting Thomas L. Evans, 
The Realization Doctrine After Cottage Savings, 70 TAXES 897, 898 (1992)) (omission 
added). 
100 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:77 
 
This ability to control the timing of tax, though not ideal from the standpoints of 
fairness and efficiency, should make the prospect of taxing inter vivos dispositions 
more tolerable to taxpayers than a mark-to-market system.  
Taxing transfers of property at death will likely trigger greater objections 
because unlike inter vivos transfers, a taxpayer cannot avoid the transfer of all 
property at death. The income tax consequences of death under current law, 
however, are inconsistent and difficult to justify—the fact that unrealized gains are 
not taxed but basis is nevertheless stepped-up to fair market value confers a double 
benefit that most voters should perceive as irrational.117 Restoring rationality by 
taxing gains at death, therefore, should be less politically problematic than 
implementing a mark-to-market system.118 
C. Disposition Standard Simplifies the Law 
Many ambiguities surround the realization requirement under current law. First, 
a realization event has never been defined.119 Instead, ambiguous statutory 
provisions and a confused common law are the only guideposts for discerning the 
contours of realization.120 In addition, the requirement that a contemporaneous 
benefit must be received for realization to occur further clouds the determination of 
a realization event and the measurement of gain.121 These ambiguities create 
uncertainty that unnecessarily complicates the law.122 
Refining the realization requirement to treat every disposition as a realization 
event without regard to the benefit received would dramatically simplify the law. 
The ambiguity associated with what constitutes a realization event would be 
replaced by a clear standard; namely, any transfer of property would be a 
realization event.123 Moreover, the act of transferring property is a comprehensible 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See I.R.C. §1014. But see supra note 89. Some, however, have argued that the step 
up in basis at death is “paid for” by the estate tax on the appreciation. Lawrence Zelenak, 
Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 364 (1993) (stating, but criticizing, the 
argument). 
 118. Rationality could also be restored by denying a step up in basis to the decedent’s 
beneficiaries and perpetuating deferral until the beneficiary disposes of the property. But 
perpetuating deferral beyond death undermines the revenue goals of the modified tax system. 
See Dodge, supra note 111, at 529–30. The dramatic decline in asset values in recent years 
might further mitigate the resistance to a disposition standard now that so much less untaxed 
appreciation exists. 
 119. See supra note 4. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26 (delineating statutory provisions); infra 
Part III.B (delineating common law of realization). 
 121. See supra Part I.C (suggesting that once the contemporaneous benefit requirement is 
weakened, there is no longer a conceptual basis from which to determine and measure 
realization). 
 122. See Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber, supra note 4, at 123 (“By deferring tax 
consequences beyond the point in time when the income (or loss) economically occurs, 
realization significantly increases complexity . . . .”). 
 123. Realization is a mechanical standard under this approach. When realization occurs, 
Congress can nevertheless defer taxation in appropriate cases by enacting targeted 
nonrecognition rules. See infra text accompanying notes 158–60.  
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standard. People normally know when they part with ownership of property.124 In 
addition, measuring gain by looking to the fair market value of the property 
transferred eliminates the complexity of attempting to value amorphous benefits 
under current law’s system of tying realization to the receipt of a contemporaneous 
benefit.125  
Utilizing a disposition standard for realization would mitigate the inequities and 
inefficiencies created by the current realization requirement. Moreover, these 
improvements can be achieved without creating the same degree of valuation, 
liquidity, and political issues as a mark-to-market system. The disposition standard 
would also simplify existing law by substituting a clear and administrable set of 
rules for the current ambiguous and anachronistic system. Part III explains how the 
proposed disposition standard would be implemented and explores the impact of 
the new system on current law. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF A DISPOSITION STANDARD 
The implementation of a disposition standard for realization would not be 
difficult. This Part explains how the disposition standard could be codified. It then 
compares the treatment of a series of potential realization events under current law 
to their treatment under the new disposition standard. 
A. Statutory Changes 
A realization event has never been defined by statute. For more than eighty 
years, federal tax law has merely quantified the gain that results when a realization 
event occurs.126 That gain is measured by the amount of consideration received for 
the transferred property.127 
This Article proposes the creation of a new statutory structure to implement the 
proposed disposition standard of realization. First, a realization event would be 
defined as follows: 
Gain or loss is realized when a disposition of property occurs.128 
Second, the gain that results when a realization event occurs would be quantified as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. But see Estate of Starr v. Comm’r, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) (addressing a 
situation where it was unclear whether a sale or lease had occurred). 
 125. See infra Part III.B.5–8 (discussing amorphous benefits to transferor in cases such as 
charitable contributions, inter vivos gifts, testamentary transfers, and foreclosures). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48; I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (“The gain from 
the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom 
over the adjusted basis . . . .”). 
 127. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (“The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of 
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property 
(other than money) received.”). The income resulting from a realization event is now 
described as “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.” Id. § 61(a)(3). 
 128. This provision would replace I.R.C. § 1001(a). See supra note 126. 
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The amount of gain realized from a disposition of property shall be 
the excess of the fair market value of the transferred property over 
its adjusted basis.129 
Hence, under the proposed disposition standard, the gain would be measured by the 
value of the transferred property, rather than the consideration received. This 
treatment is sensible because the value of the transferred property captures the 
amount of accrued appreciation that previously had not been taxed.130 
B. Comparison of Current Law to Disposition Standard 
This Section examines a series of transactions involving appreciated property 
under both current law and the proposed disposition standard. It illustrates how the 
proposed disposition standard would modify current law. The discussion reveals 
that the proposed standard would simplify current law and potentially generate 
additional tax revenue. 
1. Sale of Appreciated Property 
A sale (i.e., a transfer of property in exchange for cash consideration) is the 
classic realization event under current law.131 A sale would remain a realization 
event under the proposed disposition standard because a sale entails a transfer of 
property.132 Under current law, gain is quantified by looking to the amount of cash 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. This language would replace the first sentence of I.R.C. § 1001(b). The second 
sentence of I.R.C. § 1001(b) would be modified as follows: “The amount of loss realized 
from the disposition of property shall be the excess of the adjusted basis of the property over 
the fair market value.” The rules that currently limit the allowance of losses should continue 
to apply under the new disposition standard. See supra note 24.  
 130. The income resulting from a realization event would be described as “recognized 
gains from the disposition of property.” This description would replace the current law’s 
“[g]ains derived from dealings in property” description. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3). Other 
corresponding statutory changes should also be made. For example, the “sale or exchange” 
language in I.R.C. § 1001(c) should be replaced by “disposition” and the basis rule in I.R.C. 
§ 1015 should be changed to the fair market value of the transferred property (but the 
existing basis rule for gifts of loss property should be retained). 
 131. See, e.g., Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929) (stating that the income tax 
laws “do not charge for appreciation of property or allow a loss from a fall in market value 
unless realized in money by a sale”) (emphasis added); In re Perlman, 188 B.R. 704, 708 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (“Gain or loss is not considered for tax purposes until it is ‘realized.’ 
Gain is usually ‘realized’ only upon the happening of a taxable event, for example, when 
property is sold or exchanged.”) (emphasis added); IRS, GEN. COUNS. MEM. 38838, IN RE: 
WHETHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS MAY DEDUCT LOSSES ON THEIR EXCHANGE OF 
SIMILAR MORTGAGE POOLS 6 (Apr. 19, 1982) (“Since the case involved a sale rather than an 
exchange, there was obviously a change in the substance of the property of the taxpayer, and 
the sale was a realization event.”). 
 132. See supra text accompanying note 128 (stating a new statutory definition of 
realization event). 
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received.133 By contrast, under the proposed disposition standard, gain would be 
measured by the value of the transferred property, without regard to the 
consideration received.134 In the vast majority of sales, of course, the value of the 
transferred property will be equivalent to the amount of the cash received in which 
case the seller’s gain would not change under the new standard.135 
2. Exchange of Appreciated Property for Other Property 
An exchange of one property for another constitutes a realization event under 
current law, and would remain a realization event under the proposed disposition 
standard.136 Under current law, the transferor’s gain is quantified by the value of 
the property received.137 By contrast, under a disposition standard, gain would be 
quantified by the value of the property transferred.138 Here again, each party to an 
exchange would normally be expected to transfer an equivalent amount of 
consideration in which case the magnitude of the parties’ gains would not change 
under the new standard.139 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 129 (providing a new statutory rule quantifying 
realized gain). 
 135. If disparate amounts were involved, however, the value of the transferred property 
would still measure the transferor’s gain and any excess cash or property would be treated 
separately from the sale and governed by general income tax principles. 
 136. For current law, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (2010) (defining “exchange”). See 
Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–62 (1991) (holding that a property 
exchange gives rise to a realization event as long as the exchanged properties are “materially 
different”). For the proposed disposition standard, see supra text accompanying note 128. 
 137. I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 129. Under current law, the basis in the property 
received in an exchange is determined by the value of the property received because the 
value of the property received measures the transferor’s gain. See Phila. Park Amusement 
Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (stating that the basis of property 
received in an exchange is determined by the value of the property received). That basis 
principle would not apply under the proposed disposition standard. Rather, under the 
proposed disposition standard, the value of the property transferred would establish the basis 
in the property received by the transferor because the value of the transferred property 
measures the transferor’s gain. 
 139. When one person exchanges property with another, it is unlikely that the value of 
both properties will be equivalent. But if the parties are unrelated, one would expect the 
consideration to be “evened up” by having the transferor of the property of lesser value add 
some cash to make up the difference. If a transferor were to receive consideration of greater 
or lesser value than the property transferred, the transferor’s gain would still be based on the 
value of the property transferred—a departure from current law. In these circumstances, any 
excess value flowing one way or the other would be treated separately from the exchange 
and governed by general income tax principles.  
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3. Exchange of Appreciated Property for Past or Future Services 
Although courts have readily treated an exchange of property for services as a 
realization event,140 they rarely address the threshold question of whether services 
can constitute the requisite benefit for realization to occur. Instead, the courts focus 
on the difficult issue of quantifying the transferor’s gain in these circumstances.141 
This determination is complicated by a statutory definition that limits the amount 
realized to the “sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the 
property (other than money) received.”142 Quite clearly, services are not “money” 
or “other property.” Nevertheless, the courts have willingly treated services as 
constituting the requisite benefit for realization.143  
It is not surprising that the courts have treated services as a benefit received by 
the transferor of property when the property compensates the service performer for 
past services. In these circumstances, a benefit in the form of the services was in 
fact received by the transferor of the property. It is far more difficult to identify the 
requisite benefit to the transferor when property is conveyed for the performance of 
future services because no benefit is derived by the transferor of the property until 
the services are actually performed. Nevertheless, the courts have managed to find 
the requisite contemporaneous benefit in these circumstances. For example, one 
court treated the transferor as receiving a benefit equal to the amount of a tax 
deduction allowed for the value of the transferred property.144 Another court simply 
equated future services to past services to establish the requisite benefit.145 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. The clearest statement is found in International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner: 
“[A]s the delivery of the shares here constituted a disposition for a valid consideration, it 
resulted in a closed transaction with a consequent realized gain.” 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 
1943) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 
1960) (assuming that a realization event occurred when the taxpayer-employer contributed 
assets to employees’ retirement trust); Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992, 995 
(Ct. Cl. 1968) (same).  
 141. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d at 12; Int’l Freighting Corp., 135 F.2d at 313; Tasty 
Baking Co., 393 F.2d at 995. 
 142. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added).  
 143. See Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d at 12; Int’l Freighting Corp., 135 F.2d at 313; Tasty 
Baking Co., 393 F.2d at 995. Although the result seems unremarkable, it deviates from the 
clear statutory language. Services are not “‘cash’ or ‘property.’” Dodge, supra note 111, at 
436. 
 144. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d at 13 (“The ‘property’ received is an economic gain to 
the taxpayer of exactly the market or assessed valuation which the taxpayer used as a 
deduction on its income tax returns.”). Compensation paid for services, whether in the form 
of money or property, is allowed as a deduction to the extent the amount is reasonable. See 
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). 
 145. See Tasty Baking Co., 393 F.2d at 994. In Tasty Baking Co., the taxpayer claimed a 
deduction for the value of assets contributed to a pension trust and claimed that its amount 
realized should be limited to the tax savings created by the deduction, rather than the full fair 
market value of the property transferred. Id. The court stated that International Freighting 
Corp. “is applicable in the business situation such as we have here, if we add: ‘services past 
and future.’” Id. at 995 (quoting Int’l Freighting Corp., 135 F.2d at 313).  
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Although the courts have routinely treated the receipt of services as the requisite 
benefit to establish realization, the courts have effectively conceded that these 
services cannot be valued independently of the transferred property.146 Specifically, 
the courts have consistently looked to the value of the property to serve as a proxy 
for establishing the value of the benefit received by the transferor of the property.147 
Hence, when property is exchanged for services, current law looks to the value of 
the property transferred to quantify the transferor’s gain. 
The disposition standard proposed by this Article would rationalize and simplify 
current law when applied to the transfer of property for services. Under the 
disposition standard, realization would occur whenever property is transferred.148 
Hence, a transfer of property for services would trigger a realization event without 
regard to the consideration received by the transferor. Moreover, under the 
proposed standard, the transferor would be taxed on the difference between the 
value of the transferred property and its basis—no need would exist to contend with 
the complexity of valuing the services received.149 In effect, the disposition 
standard would treat the value of the property transferred as the actual measure of 
the transferor’s income, rather than as a mere proxy for that result. Thus, the 
proposed standard would simplify the law by eliminating the analytical 
shortcomings of the current treatment of transfers of property for services. 
4. Transfer of Appreciated Property Pursuant to Divorce 
The transfer of appreciated property pursuant to divorce has historically been 
treated as a realization event with little justification for that result.150 Here again, 
the courts have looked for a benefit derived at the time of the transfer to determine 
whether realization occurred and found that “the ‘property received’ was the 
release of the wife’s inchoate marital rights.”151 Lower courts had concluded that 
the value of these marital rights was unascertainable, which precluded the 
transferor from realizing a gain on the exchange.152 The Supreme Court, in United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. See Int’l Freighting Corp., 135 F.2d at 313 (“Since the bonuses would be invalid to 
the extent that what was delivered to the employees exceeded what the services of the 
employees were worth, it follows that the consideration received by the taxpayer from the 
employees must be deemed to be equal at least to the value of the shares . . . .”); accord Gen. 
Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d at 13; Tasty Baking Co., 393 F.2d at 995. 
 147. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9; Int’l Freighting Corp., 135 F.2d 310; Tasty Baking 
Co., 393 F.3d 992.  
 148. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 129.  
 150. In United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court found the “sale or other disposition” 
language of section 1001(a) to be “too general to include or exclude conclusively the 
transaction presently in issue.” 370 U.S. 65, 69 (1962). It therefore rested its taxable event 
holding on the fact that every lower court that had addressed the issue had “assumed that the 
transaction was otherwise a taxable event.” Id. at 71.  
 151. Id. at 72. 
 152. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (holding that the “measure 
of the value of the wife's right to maintenance and support was dependent upon so many 
uncertain factors that neither the taxpayer nor a revenue officer could do more than guess at 
it,” and therefore no taxable gain was realized), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 370 U.S. 65 
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States v. Davis, however, circumvented the difficult issue of valuing marital rights 
by looking to the value of the property transferred to quantify the reciprocal benefit 
received.153 Here again, the value of the property transferred was used as a proxy to 
measure the transferor’s gain when ambiguity existed with regard to the value of 
the benefit the transferor received.154 
Under the proposed disposition standard, the transfer of property pursuant to 
divorce would constitute a realization event just like any other transfer of 
property.155 The value of the transferred property would also determine the 
transferor’s realized gain, rather than merely serving as a proxy for that gain.156 The 
inchoate marital rights surrendered by the spouse would be entirely irrelevant to the 
analysis.157 Hence, the same amount of gain would be realized under the disposition 
standard as under current law. The proposed standard, however, eliminates the 
complicated exercise of evaluating the benefit received to determine if a realization 
event occurred and to quantify the resulting gain. 
Subsequent to Davis, Congress enacted a statutory nonrecognition rule that 
defers the taxation of gains realized when property is transferred incident to 
divorce.158 The disposition standard for realization proposed by this Article could 
also accommodate nonrecognition rules in circumstances where Congress makes a 
policy judgment that the immediate taxation of a realized gain is inappropriate.159 
The proposed disposition standard determines the time of realization, not 
recognition.160 Thus, the best of both worlds can be achieved under the proposed 
disposition standard—it creates a clear standard of realization that mitigates the 
deferral conferred by current law, while allowing for nonrecognition treatment in 
situations where Congress deems further deferral to be appropriate.  
5. Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property 
Under current law, a gratuitous transfer of appreciated property does not trigger 
a taxable gain to the donor.161 Courts have nevertheless treated the contribution as a 
                                                                                                                 
(1962); Halliwell v. Comm’r, 44 B.T.A. 740, 748 (1941) (finding it impossible to evaluate 
the rights received by the spouse transferring property in a divorce and, therefore, to 
compute an amount realized), rev’d 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Mesta v. Comm’r, 42 
B.T.A. 933, 940 (1940) (finding that the impossibility of valuing the rights received by a 
spouse transferring property in a divorce precludes realization), rev’d 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 
1941). 
 153. Davis, 370 U.S. at 72–73. 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 147 (describing the treatment of the value of 
transferred property as a proxy for the value of services received). 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 157. It is unlikely that the rights surrendered by the spouse would significantly deviate 
from the value of the property transferred in light of the adverse interests of the parties.  
 158. I.R.C. § 1041 (2006).  
 159. I.R.C. § 1001(c) would be unaffected by the proposal, other than to conform the 
“sale or exchange” reference in that provision to the new disposition standard. 
 160. See I.R.C. § 1001(c).  
 161. See Humacid Co. v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 894, 913 (1964) (involving a charitable 
contribution).  
The law with respect to gifts of appreciated property is well established. A gift 
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realization event because the transfer represents a “disposition” of property.162 
However, the courts have found that the transferor’s amount realized under these 
circumstances is zero. “[T]he amount realized by petitioners under section 1001(b) 
on the disposition of their stock was zero, as it would be for any charitable 
contributor who receives no consideration in return for his contribution.”163 
The tax treatment of charitable contributions of appreciated property under 
current law is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, although this Article advocates 
the adoption of a disposition standard for realization, no evidence exists that 
Congress or the early courts ever believed that a mere transfer of property was 
sufficient for a realization event.164 Rather, the receipt of a contemporaneous 
benefit (in the form of money, property, services, or even inchoate marital rights) 
had been deemed necessary for realization to occur.165 Thus, the courts’ finding that 
a charitable contribution constitutes a realization event in the absence of a 
contemporaneous benefit cannot be reconciled with current law. 
Second, if a realization event were to occur when appreciated property is 
contributed to charity, it is far from clear that the donor’s amount realized would be 
zero. A donor may normally deduct the full fair market value of property 
contributed to charity regardless of the donor’s basis in the property.166 At least one 
court has treated the deduction resulting from a transfer of property as providing 
the requisite benefit for a realization event.167 Although it is questionable whether a 
donor derives a benefit equal to the nominal amount of the deduction, a donor who 
transfers appreciated property to charity without being taxed on the gain and 
                                                                                                                 
of appreciated property does not result in income to the donor so long as he 
gives the property away absolutely and parts with title thereto before the 
property gives rise to income by way of a sale. 
Id.  
 162. Withers v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 900, 904 (1978) (“Section 1001 computes gain or loss 
whenever there is a ‘sale or other disposition of property.’ Petitioners’ contribution of stock 
constituted a disposition within the meaning of section 1001.”); see also Ebben v. Comm’r, 
783 F.2d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 1986) (involving a charitable contribution of real estate securing 
nonrecourse debt, and simply relying on Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(iii), for its statement 
that “the phrase ‘other disposition of property’ includes a gift of property”); Guest v. 
Comm’r, 77 T.C. 9, 21 (1981) (“[G]ifts (including charitable contributions) are dispositions 
within the meaning of section 1001(a).”); BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & 
LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 28.03 (3d ed. 2002) 
(“[A] gift is obviously a ‘disposition’ of property in the layperson’s sense . . . .”); 
Kornhauser, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 4, at 48 (“A gift is obviously a disposition 
of property and, but for section 102, should be a taxable event under section 1001 to the 
donor unless there is some added dimension to realization that a gift does not fit.”). 
 163. Withers, 69 T.C. at 904–05 (emphasis added); see also Guest, 77 T.C. at 21 (“[I]n 
the usual case a taxpayer receives nothing in exchange for making a gift, and thus his section 
1001(a) ‘amount realized’ is zero.”) (citing Withers, 69 T.C. at 904).  
 164. See supra Part I.D. 
 165. See supra Part I.B. 
 166. I.R.C. § 170 (2006). The fair market value must normally be reduced by the amount 
of gain that would not be long-term capital gain if the property had been sold by the donor 
for its fair market value (determined at the time of the deduction). I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A).  
 167. United States v. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 13 (6th Cir. 1960) (“The ‘property’ 
received is an economic gain to the taxpayer of exactly the market or assessed valuation 
which the taxpayer used as a deduction on its income tax returns.”).  
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deducts the full market value of the property undeniably derives a net economic 
benefit from the transfer.168 In addition to the benefit of the tax deduction, a donor 
undoubtedly reaps psychological rewards that are arguably as real as the 
amorphous “inchoate marital rights” surrendered by an ex-spouse pursuant to a 
divorce.169 Thus, the common law stance that a donor of appreciated property 
derives no benefit from the contribution is questionable. 
In contrast to current law, under the proposed disposition standard for 
realization, a realization event would occur when appreciated property is 
contributed to charity because the contribution entails a transfer of the property.170 
The donor would be taxed on the difference between the market value of the 
contributed property and its basis.171 Thus, the deferral of tax on the appreciation 
that accrued prior to the contribution would be terminated when the contribution 
occurs. The nature and extent of the benefit derived by the donor when the 
contribution occurs would be irrelevant to, and thereby simplify, the analysis. In 
addition to being logical and simple, the proposed disposition standard would yield 
a new source of tax revenue when applied to charitable contributions of appreciated 
property. To fully evaluate the revenue effect, however, behavioral adjustments 
must be considered. For example, fewer charitable contributions of appreciated 
property might occur after the disposition standard is adopted because the tax on 
the unrealized gain might deter potential donors.172  
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. It would seem more logical to treat the benefit as limited to the tax savings derived 
from the deduction. See Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992, 994 (Ct. Cl. 1968) 
(involving a taxpayer who claimed a deduction for the value of assets contributed to pension 
trust and then claimed that the trust’s amount realized should be limited to the tax savings 
created by the deduction, rather than the full fair market value of the property transferred). 
 169. See supra Part III.B.4 (explaining how courts dealing with transfers of appreciated 
property pursuant to divorce have historically treated “inchoate marital rights” as property). 
Psychic benefits are not generally captured by the definition of gross income. As a purely 
administrative matter, these benefits are normally difficult to quantify (e.g., the joy I get 
from looking out the window on a sunny day) and precedent exists for excluding them from 
the tax base even in the absence of an explicit statutory exclusion. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra 
note 64, at 27–28 (“Life is full of benefit producing activities—shaving oneself, mowing 
one’s own lawn, jogging around the block for exercise—which might at a stretch be 
converted to market purchases for cash. But presumably no one would seriously argue that § 
61 should be broadened to include such imputations . . . .”). 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 129. The donor would still be allowed a 
deduction for the fair market value of the property. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006). It would be 
sensible to still allow the donor to deduct the entire market value of the property because the 
donor is taxed on the accrued gain at the time of the contribution. Unlike current law, the 
donor would now be treated in the same manner as if she sold the property and contributed 
the proceeds to charity. 
 172. Note that the taxpayer contributing appreciated property to charity would continue 
to enjoy a characterization benefit under the proposed disposition standard; namely, a capital 
gain with respect to the realization event and an ordinary deduction with respect to the 
charitable contribution. Whether this type of characterization benefit should be curtailed is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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6. Inter Vivos Gift of Appreciated Property 
The tax treatment of gifts of appreciated property has a convoluted history that 
effectively precluded the courts from confronting the threshold question of whether 
a gift is a realization event. At the origin of the tax law, three benefits were 
bestowed on gifts of appreciated property. First, the donor was not taxed on the 
appreciation in the gifted property when the gift was made.173 Second, the donee 
was permitted to exclude the value of the property from income.174 Finally, the 
donee was allowed to step-up the basis in the property to market value.175 In 1921, 
Congress eliminated the third benefit by limiting the donee’s basis to that of the 
donor.176 This amendment, however, was not intended to bless the donor’s ability 
to transfer the appreciated property without triggering the gain. 
Closing this avenue of avoidance by requiring the donee to take the 
same basis as the donor did not mean that Congress meant to exclude 
the appreciation from the donor’s income if it was constitutionally 
taxable. Congress simply did not give the matter any thought . . . .177 
As a general matter, the courts have refrained from treating a gift as a realization 
event,178 notwithstanding that a gift is undoubtedly a “disposition.”179 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. See Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929) (involving a donee who was taxed on the 
appreciation that had accrued while property was in the hands of the donor without any 
discussion of why the donor was not taxed on the appreciation in the gifted property). 
 174. See Kornhauser, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 4, at 13, 38 (explaining that all 
tax legislation following the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment excluded gifts and 
bequests from gross income without any explanation for the exclusion).  
 175. Id. at 49–50 (explaining that a donee was accorded a fair market value basis in 
gifted property from 1913 until 1921). 
 176. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(a)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 229. 
 177. Edward T. Roehner & Shelia M. Roehner, Realization: Administration Convenience 
or Constitutional Requirement?, 8 TAX L. REV. 173, 191 (1953). 
 178. In Evangelista v. Commissioner, which involved a gift of encumbered cars to a 
trust for the benefit of the taxpayer’s children where the trust assumed the taxpayer’s 
recourse liability, the court concluded that gifts are not realization events because “if 
Congress intended a transfer that is properly characterized as a gift to be a taxable 
disposition it would have shown this intent more explicitly.” 629 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th 
Cir. 1980). But the Evangelista court concluded that insufficient facts existed to 
support a finding that a gift was made and therefore the transaction was a taxable 
disposition. Id. at 1224–25; see also Diedrich v. Comm’r, 457 U.S. 191, 198–200 
(1982) (determining that a donor realized gain when she made a gift of appreciated 
property conditioned on the donee’s agreement to pay the gift tax; Justice Rehnquist, 
in dissent, remarked, “[t]he Court in this case . . . begs the question of whether a 
taxable transaction has taken place at all”). But see Levine v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 780, 
789 (1979) (involving a gift of real estate to a trust for the taxpayer’s grandchildren 
where the court stated: “That there was a disposition of the property by decedent 
seems clear. . . . The question, however, is not whether a disposition occurred within 
the meaning of section 1001(b), but whether a gain was realized from such 
disposition.”), aff’d, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 179. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(iii) (2009) (providing that “[a] disposition of 
110 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:77 
 
jurisprudence in the gift area comports with the historic view that a transfer of 
property, though necessary for a realization event, is not sufficient because a 
contemporaneous benefit also must be received by the transferor.180 The courts 
have never explored the question of whether the donor of appreciated property 
derives a benefit. A donor undoubtedly enjoys psychological benefits from making 
a gift, but benefits of that type are probably too amorphous to satisfy current law’s 
contemporaneous benefit requirement for realization.181 Moreover, no tax benefit is 
derived by a donor because gifts (unlike charitable contributions) are not 
deductible.182 
Although a gift has not historically been treated as a realization event, there is 
nothing inherently unique about a gratuitous transfer that would preclude Congress 
from treating a gift as a realization event.183 No constitutional impediment exists to 
taxing the accrued appreciation existing in property transferred as a gift.184 
Moreover, other commentators have advocated this result.185 Congress, therefore, 
could tax the unrealized appreciation in property transferred gratuitously simply by 
adopting the “disposition” standard advanced in this Article. 
If the proposed disposition standard for realization were adopted, a gift of 
appreciated property, like any other transfer of property, would constitute a 
realization event.186 The donor’s gain would be measured by the difference between 
                                                                                                                 
property includes a gift of the property or a transfer of the property in satisfaction of 
liabilities to which it is subject”). 
 180. See supra Part I.B (discussing how the courts have historically interpreted the 
realization requirement as mandating the transfer of property in exchange for 
contemporaneous consideration). 
 181. See supra note 169; BITTKER ET AL., supra note 162, at ¶ 28.03 (“[T]axpayers 
making gifts . . . could be viewed as receiving non-economic satisfactions equal to the value 
of the transferred property.”). 
 182. I.R.C. § 262 (2006) (noting that “personal, living, or family expenses” (such as 
gifts) are not tax deductible).  
 183. BITTKER ET AL., supra note 162, at ¶ 28.03 n.13 (“[T]he making of a gift or bequest 
could be viewed as an appropriate time to tax the transferor on appreciation not yet taxed . . . .”). 
 184. See, e.g., President’s 1963 Tax Message, supra note 16, at 596–602 
(delineating an opinion of the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury as to 
the constitutionality of taxing the accrued appreciation in a gratuitous transfer of 
appreciated property); Surrey, supra note 64, at 791 (“[T]he gift of any property which 
has appreciated in value should be a realization of the economic gain represented by 
such appreciation. Income taxation of donors at the time of their gift is thus 
permissible. . . . Whether donor or donee . . . should bear the tax is a question now of 
policy alone, unconfused by supposed constitutional restrictions.”). But see Ordower, 
supra note 64, at 58 (“While deferral of taxation on gratuitous transfer may lack the 
constitutional foundation of the general realization principle, it nevertheless may be as 
firmly entrenched in the tax law as that principle and remain . . . far more than a 
simple matter of administrative convenience.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Kornhauser, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 4, at 54 (“A new 
provision should be enacted stating that a gift . . . is a realization event to the donor . . . and 
thus taxable to him . . . .”); SIMONS, supra note 2, at 166 (“Every transfer of property by gift 
should be treated as a realization, at the fair market value as of the date of the transfer, by the 
donor.”). 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
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the value of the property transferred and the donor’s basis.187 The benefit, if any, 
received by the donor would be irrelevant to the analysis. The transfer would 
merely terminate the deferral previously conferred on the appreciation of the 
donor’s property.188 Treating a gift of appreciated property as a realization event 
should also help to generate additional tax revenue.189 
7. Transfer of Appreciated Property at Death 
The income tax law of the United States has never treated death as a realization 
event.190 Nevertheless, the basis of a decedent’s appreciated property is stepped up 
to market value when death occurs.191 Hence, under current law, untaxed 
appreciation that accrues during a taxpayer’s lifetime is entirely exempt from 
income tax if the property is held until death. As Professor Zelenak explains, this 
exemption does not manifest a policy decision: 
This tax forgiveness did not originate as a conscious policy decision. 
Rather, it occurred almost accidentally from the combination of two 
ideas that were accepted instinctively during the early years of the 
income tax: that the mere transfer of property at death did not constitute 
a realization of gain or loss on the property, and that fair market value 
basis for heirs was appropriate to prevent taxation of capital . . . .192 
It is understandable that death would not be treated as a realization event in a 
system that historically conditioned realization on the receipt of a contemporaneous 
benefit when property is transferred. No apparent benefit is enjoyed by a decedent 
when death occurs.193 Consequently, as long as realization is deemed to require the 
receipt of a contemporaneous benefit, death cannot be a realization event.  
Although death has not historically been treated as a realization event, Congress 
could establish that result by enacting the disposition standard proposed by this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 188. If gifts of appreciated property are treated as realization events, Congress should 
permit the donee to step-up the basis in the gifted property to market value because all the 
previously untaxed appreciation would be taxed to the donor when the gift occurs. 
 189. The revenue effect would result from acceleration of income by triggering it to the 
donor rather than preserving it for the donee. See I.R.C. § 1015 (2006). Here again, 
behavioral effects must be considered when evaluating revenue effects. For example, the 
disposition standard might cause certain gifts that otherwise would have been made to be 
deferred due to the income tax imposed on gifts of appreciated property. It is assumed that 
the current federal gift tax would be retained when the disposition standard is adopted for 
income tax purposes. 
 190. See supra note 16. Other countries, such as Canada, treat death as a realization 
event. Dodge, supra note 111, at 431.  
 191. I.R.C. § 1014 (2006). But see supra note 89. 
 192. Zelenak, supra note 117, at 363–64 (emphasis added). 
 193. The step-up in basis conferred on the decedent’s successor constitutes a benefit from 
death, but this basis adjustment does not benefit the decedent. See I.R.C. § 1014. But see 
supra note 89. 
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Article. The Constitution does not impede the treatment of death as a realization 
event.194 Moreover, other commentators have advocated this result.195  
At death, the decedent’s assets are necessarily transferred pursuant to the 
decedent’s instructions or by operation of law. Under a disposition standard for 
realization, therefore, death would represent an event that terminates the deferral of 
tax on gains that accrued during the decedent’s lifetime.196 The gains realized at 
death would be based on the market value of the decedent’s property.197 The issue 
of whether the decedent derives any benefit from death would be irrelevant as to 
both whether realization occurred and the magnitude of the decedent’s gains. 
Although the proposed disposition standard still allows gains to be deferred until 
death, the new standard would no longer permit deferral to be extended beyond 
one’s lifetime.198 As a result, treating death as a realization event should reduce the 
existing incentive to defer lifetime transfers and thereby generate additional tax 
revenue.199 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See, e.g., President’s 1963 Tax Message, supra note 16, at 596–602 (delineating an 
opinion of the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury as to the constitutionality 
of taxing the accrued appreciation in a testamentary transfer of appreciated property); 
Surrey, supra note 64, at 791 (“[T]axation of decedents on any hitherto unrealized 
appreciation in value of the property constituting their estate is entirely proper under the 
income tax, because of the ‘realization’ `` that occurs at death. Whether . . . decedent or 
legatee, should bear the tax is a question now of policy alone, unconfused by supposed 
constitutional restrictions.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Laura E. Cunningham & Noël B. Cunningham, Commentary: Realization 
of Gains Under the Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 271, 276–80 (2009) 
(arguing that realization at death rule is preferable to carryover basis at death rule on grounds 
of simplicity, efficiency, equity, and revenue-raising potential); Dodge, supra note 111, at 
439 (“[T]he central point is that attributing unrealized gains (and losses) to the gratuitous 
transferor is correct in principle under an income tax . . . . Nor can one object that Congress 
cannot enact a deemed realization rule . . . .”); Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of 
Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms and a Rebuttal, 70 
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1381–89 (advocating taxing asset appreciation at death); Shaviro, 
supra note 4, at 6 (recommending a change in the law to “[t]reat transfers by reason of death 
as taxable sales for fair market value”); Victor Thuronyi, Capital Gains and Tax Reform, 123 
TAX NOTES 1244, 1245 (2009) (“All gains should be taxed at death or earlier.”). 
 196. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 129. By virtue of taxing previously unrealized 
appreciation at death, the step-up in basis to market value conferred by current law on the 
decedent’s successors should still apply. But see note 89.  
 198. Additional benefits of taxing gains at death include that “it enforces the principle 
that income should be taxed to the person who earned it; it imposes tax at an ideal time in 
terms of ability to pay . . . ; and, unlike carryover basis, it solves the problem of lock-in.” 
Zelenak, supra note 117, at 367.  
 199. In contrast to the behavioral changes that might result from taxing inter vivos 
gratuitous transfers of property, for example, see supra notes 172, 189 (suggesting that 
behavioral changes might result in fewer gifts and charitable contributions), it is unlikely that 
behavioral changes will result from taxing appreciated property at death (other than perhaps 
that owners of appreciated property might take better care of themselves). It is assumed that 
the current federal estate tax would be retained when the disposition standard is adopted for 
income tax purposes. Others have proposed to substitute an income tax on unrealized 
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8. Transfer of Distressed Property to Lender—Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure,  
Abandonment, Foreclosure 
When borrowers are unable or unwilling to service debt that exceeds the value 
of the property securing the debt, the distressed property can find its way back to 
the lender through a variety of different means.200 A borrower inclined to cooperate 
with the lender might voluntarily convey the property to the lender, rather than 
waiting for the lender to initiate foreclosure proceedings. By contrast, an 
uncooperative borrower might simply abandon the property in advance of 
foreclosure or, instead, hold the property until the lender forecloses. Under current 
law, the tax consequences to the transferor of distressed property differ depending 
on whether the property secures recourse debt or nonrecourse debt.201  
When distressed property is transferred to the lender in satisfaction of recourse 
debt, the tax consequences are consistent with the disposition standard proposed by 
this Article, regardless of whether the transfer is voluntary or involuntary. 
Specifically, a realization event occurs and the transferor’s gain is measured by the 
value of the transferred property.202 The portion of the debt that exceeds the value 
of the transferred property is also taxed to the transferor but independently of the 
property transfer.203 This excess debt is taxed as discharge of indebtedness income 
and can often be excluded by a financially distressed borrower.204 
Unfortunately, matters are not as simple when property securing nonrecourse 
debt is transferred. The courts have historically had little difficulty finding a 
realization event when a borrower transfers property with a value at least equal to 
the nonrecourse debt it secures.205 Under these circumstances, the shedding of the 
nonrecourse debt establishes the requisite contemporaneous benefit to trigger a 
                                                                                                                 
appreciation at death for the federal estate tax. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 111, at 431–32, 
529.  
 200. For purposes of this section, “distressed property” refers to property securing 
indebtedness in excess of the value of the property where the property is not generating 
sufficient income to service the debt. Unrealized appreciation will exist in distressed 
property when the value of the property exceeds its tax basis.  
 201. In the case of a recourse liability, the debtor’s exposure extends to all assets the 
debtor owns and is not limited to the property securing the debt. By contrast, in the case of a 
nonrecourse liability, the debtor’s exposure is limited to the property securing the debt and 
does not extend to the property owner’s other assets. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1020–
21 (9th ed. 2009) (defining recourse and nonrecourse debt).  
 202. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(2), (c) ex. 8 (2010) (demonstrating that the amount 
realized on a sale or other disposition of property securing a recourse liability is limited to 
the value of the property). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108(a)(1)(A), (B), (E) (2006) (allowing the exclusion of 
discharge of indebtedness income if the discharge occurs in a Title 11 case, when the 
taxpayer is insolvent, or if the indebtedness is qualified principal residence indebtedness 
discharged before 2013). 
 205. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). 
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realization event.206 In addition, the benefit derived from shedding the debt causes 
the transferred debt to be treated as a receipt included in the transferor’s gain.207 
When a borrower transfers property securing nonrecourse debt in excess of the 
value of the property, however, the contemporaneous benefit that current law relies 
on to establish a realization event and to measure the transferor’s gain does not 
exist.208 Nevertheless, current law treats the transaction as a realization event and 
includes the entire unpaid debt in the seller’s amount realized when distressed 
property securing nonrecourse debt is sold.209 Even in the absence of a sale, the 
courts have not been deterred from treating the voluntary return or abandonment of 
distressed property as a realization event in these circumstances.210 These results 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. See id. at 14 (when property securing nonrecourse debt is sold, a benefit equal to the 
unpaid amount of the nonrecourse debt is contemporaneously derived). 
 207. See id.; Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 458 (1st Cir. 1950) (relying on Crane’s 
holding that “the taxpayer received a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the 
boot. . . . so long as the value of the properties was not less than the liens” in the case of a 
taxpayer’s voluntary conveyance of real estate securing nonrecourse debt to the lender); 
Freeland v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 970, 974 (1980) (“That a disposition, causing gain or loss to be 
recognized under section 1001, occurs upon a reconveyance of property in satisfaction of a 
mortgage obligation is well settled.”). The same result is reached when the debtor abandons 
the property or holds the property until foreclosure. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 
510–11 (1941) (finding that the involuntary nature of foreclosure does not preclude sale 
treatment); Parker, 186 F.2d at 459 (holding that abandonment was also a disposition); 
Middleton v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 310, 319–20 (1981) (a loss case involving an abandonment of 
land securing nonrecourse debt where the court followed Freeland and found that there was 
no difference between a voluntary reconveyance and an abandonment), aff’d 693 F.2d 124 
(11th Cir. 1982). 
 208. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307–09 (1983).  
 209. Id. at 309; see I.R.C. § 7701(g) (2006) (stating that for purposes of determining gain 
or loss, the market value of property shall be treated as being not less than the amount of 
nonrecourse indebtedness the property secures); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-369, § 75, 98 Stat. 494, 594–95 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(g) (2006)), reprinted in 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 239–40 (1984). 
 210. See Yarbro v. Comm’r, 737 F.2d 479, 481–84 (5th Cir. 1984); Lockwood v. 
Comm’r, 94 T.C. 252, 255–59 (1990). Yarbro involved the abandonment of land securing 
nonrecourse debt where the debt exceeded the fair market value of the property. Yarbro, 737 
F.2d at 481–84. The main issue was characterization of the resulting loss, and the court 
relied on the Crane Court’s finding that “the taxpayer does receive a benefit from the 
disposition of the property: he is relieved of his obligation to pay the debt and taxes and 
assessments against the property” effectively ignoring the Tufts Court’s holding that no 
benefit is derived at the time of transfer when property securing debt in excess of its value is 
transferred. Id. at 484. Lockwood involved the abandonment of personalty securing 
nonrecourse debt that appears to have exceeded the value of the property where a dispute 
existed about the amount of the resulting loss. Lockwood, 94 T.C. at 255–59. The court 
invoked a pre-Tufts case, Middleton v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 310, 321 (1981), aff’d 693 F.2d 124 
(11th Cir. 1982), for the principle that “[b]eing relieved of that debt is a benefit realized by 
petitioner on the abandonment,” thus effectively ignoring the Tufts Court’s holding that no 
benefit is derived at the time of transfer when property securing debt in excess of its value is 
transferred. Id. at 259. 
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cannot be reconciled with existing jurisprudence which requires a 
contemporaneous benefit for realization to occur.211 
Far more rational results could be achieved if the disposition standard proposed 
by this Article applied to the transfer of distressed property securing nonrecourse 
debt. Under the proposed standard, a realization event would occur when property 
securing nonrecourse debt is voluntarily conveyed to the lender, abandoned, or held 
until foreclosure, just as a realization event would occur whenever property is 
transferred.212 In addition, the transferor’s gain would be based on the value of the 
transferred property, rather than the amount of the nonrecourse debt, thereby 
causing the transferor to be taxed on any previously deferred gain.213 The portion of 
the debt that exceeds the value of the property would not be included in the amount 
realized because the objective of the disposition standard is to tax only the 
appreciation in the transferred property. In this regard, the debt has nothing to do 
with the deferral of tax conferred by the realization requirement on previously 
accrued appreciation. Therefore, the portion of the nonrecourse debt exceeding the 
value of the property would be isolated from the property transfer and taxed as 
discharge of indebtedness income,214 the same result that occurs under current law 
when distressed property securing recourse debt is transferred.215 The proposed 
disposition standard would consequently rationalize and simplify the law by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309. The Tufts Court rationalized the inclusion of the 
nonrecourse debt in the amount realized as the quid pro quo for a benefit the borrower 
derived when the property was acquired. At the time of acquisition, the borrower was 
permitted to include the nonrecourse debt in the basis of the acquired property and enjoy tax 
benefits (e.g., depreciation deductions) resulting from that basis. If the owner did not repay 
the debt before transferring the property, the owner was required to “pay” for the basis 
conferred when the property was acquired by including the unpaid debt in the amount 
realized. Although no contemporaneous benefit was derived from shedding the debt when 
the property was transferred, the time of transfer was the last chance to make the owner 
“pay” for the tax benefits enjoyed while the taxpayer owned the property. Otherwise, the 
owner would enjoy the tax benefits from the basis in the property without paying for them.  
 212. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 129. The fact that the property secures debt in 
excess of its value does not preclude gain because the value of the property could still exceed 
its basis. If, however, the basis of the property exceeded its value, a loss would be realized 
when the property is transferred. 
 214. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2006). Discharge of indebtedness income can often be excluded 
by a financially distressed borrower. See supra note 204. Others have advocated this 
bifurcated treatment of nonrecourse debt. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 318 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The logical way to treat . . . this case . . . is to separate the two aspects of these 
events and to consider, first, the ownership and sale of the property, and, second, the 
arrangement and retirement of the loan.”); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and 
Brief for Wayne G. Barnett as Amicus Curiae, Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (No. 81-2536) 
(advocating that the property element of the transaction be treated discretely from the debt 
element of the transaction). The Tufts Court felt it was too late in the game to isolate the 
excess debt from the sale in light of Crane and its progeny. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 (majority 
opinion). 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 201–04. 
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reconciling the tax treatment of property transfers involving nonrecourse debt with 
property transfers involving recourse debt.  
9. Destruction or Theft of Appreciated Property 
Under current law, no realization event occurs when uninsured property is stolen 
or destroyed. Realization does not occur in these situations because no 
contemporaneous benefit is derived by the taxpayer.216 Under a disposition 
standard, however, realization occurs when property is transferred, regardless of 
whether the transfer is voluntary or involuntary.217 The destruction of property 
effectuates a transfer and, therefore, should constitute a realization event under a 
disposition standard.218 Stolen property, on the other hand, is not transferred 
because ownership continues to reside in the victim of the theft.219 If, however, it 
ultimately becomes apparent that the stolen property will never be recovered, 
realization would occur under the proposed disposition standard. Tying realization 
to a determination that stolen property will not be recovered introduces an element 
of uncertainty to the system that could undermine the simplicity achieved by the 
disposition standard. 
Strong political resistance would likely exist to treating the destruction and theft 
of appreciated property as events that trigger taxable gains.220 If the proposed 
disposition standard is adopted, it would be prudent for Congress to refrain from 
taxing the accrued appreciation when appreciated property is destroyed or stolen. 
Congress can achieve this result by enacting a targeted nonrecognition rule that 
applies to destroyed and stolen property.221 Such a rule would deter the tax 
treatment of this relatively small subset of property transfers from serving as a 
lightning rod for opposition to the proposed disposition standard. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. If insurance proceeds are received for the property, the events would be treated as a 
sale for tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006) (allowing for elective nonrecognition of gain 
on involuntarily converted property under certain circumstances). 
 217. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 218. The fact that the transferor no longer owns the property establishes that a disposition 
occurred; the absence of a transferee is irrelevant to the analysis. 
 219. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 
717 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (“[A] thief never obtains title to stolen items, and . 
. . one can pass no greater title than one has. Therefore, one who obtains stolen items from a 
thief never obtains title to or right to possession of the item.”) (citing Torian v. McClure, 83 
Ind. 310 (1882); Breckenridge v. McAfee, 54 Ind. 141 (1876)); 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 
34 (2008) (“[T]he theft of goods or chattels does not divest one who owns, or has title to, 
such property from his or her ownership of the property, since one cannot make good title to 
that which he or she does not own. The owner may follow and reclaim the stolen goods 
wherever he or she may find them . . . .”). 
 220. It should, however, be noted that in many cases, the victim of the casualty or theft 
would be allowed a deduction for the market value of the property if the gain were triggered. 
By contrast, under current law, the deduction is limited to the basis of the property. See 
I.R.C. § 165(b), (c)(3). 
 221. Some precedent exists for exceptions of this sort. See I.R.C. § 1033 (allowing for 
elective nonrecognition of gain on involuntarily converted property under certain 
circumstances). 
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10. Non-Dispositions: Mortgage, Pledge, Option, Partition 
A variety of transactions that do not constitute realization events under current 
law would still not be realization events under a disposition standard. For example, 
the mortgaging of property, even when the mortgage proceeds exceed the 
taxpayer’s basis in the property, would not be a realization event because no 
transfer of property has occurred.222 Similarly, the acts of pledging, optioning, and 
partitioning property would not constitute realization events because no transfer of 
ownership occurs in these situations. Although it is arguable that some of these 
transactions should terminate the deferral of tax on accrued appreciation,223 the 
proposed disposition standard should be enacted and its impact assessed before 
considering any further relaxation of the realization requirement.  
CONCLUSION 
The realization requirement has always been a fundamental element of the 
United States income tax. Yet, the requirement remains an enigma as antiquated 
notions that a contemporaneous benefit is required to terminate the deferral of the 
tax on accrued gains continue to thrive. The realization requirement is inequitable, 
inefficient, and complicates the tax system. For these reasons, and because of the 
ever increasing revenue needs of the United States, a new standard should be 
adopted that curtails the deferral of tax on accrued gains. 
This Article proposes the adoption of a disposition standard of realization that 
would treat every transfer of property as a realization event. Under this standard, 
when appreciated property is transferred, the accrued appreciation would be taxed 
without regard to the consideration received by the transferor. As such, the mere 
transfer of property would normally terminate the deferral of tax on all previously 
accrued gains. Unlike current law, the new standard would terminate tax deferral 
now conferred on gratuitous inter vivos and testamentary transfers of appreciated 
property. 
A disposition standard of realization would curtail the inequity and inefficiency 
of the current realization requirement. In addition, a disposition standard of 
realization would simplify the law by substituting a clear and administrable set of 
rules for an ambiguous and anachronistic system. Although a disposition standard 
does not eliminate all the problems associated with a realization based tax system, 
it would dramatically improve the system and help to generate much needed tax 
revenue. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 222. See Woodsam Assoc. v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952) (finding that a 
borrowing against property is not a realization event). 
 223. See, e.g., Anthony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of Capital Conventions, and the 
Structure of the Income Tax: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 17 VA. TAX REV. 467, 
481–505 (1998) (demonstrating the absence of any compelling principle that justifies 
treating a borrowing transaction as a non-taxable event). 
